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Summary
          The Nanyō Kyōkai (South Seas Association 南洋協会) was a semi-private, 
semi-governmental organization in existence from 1915 to 1945 which has a 
curious position in scholarship regarding Japan-Southeast Asian interactions 
during this period, especially in English language scholarship. With the exception 
of a couple of articles that provide an overview of the association, its name and 
activities turn up from time to time in various studies as an actor involved in 
promoting Japanese trade, investment and emigration to the region through 
research and lobbying activities; as a nefarious espionage and propaganda 
organization masquerading as a harmless promoter of economic interaction; or as 
an advance guard for Japan’s southward advance which materialized in the form 
of armed invasion and occupation of the greater part of the region between 1941 
and 1945. Japanese language scholarship offers more information and analysis on 
the varied aspects of this organization’s multi-faceted activities, but mainly focus 
on a single aspect of the association. This study is thus an attempt to achieve a 
better understanding of the Nanyō Kyōkai, not just as an institution but also 
through linking it with ideological trends and geopolitical strategy which predated 
the association’s founding and also provided the historical context in which the 
association’s history unfolded. Shifts and developments in these ideologies in 
accordance to domestic and foreign policy imperatives impacted upon the 
development and history of the association, but the association also exerted its 
influence on the courses of their development.  Attention will also be devoted to 
iv
Japanese research activities and production of knowledge in Asia which has 
received relatively little academic attention, through comparing the Nanyō Kyōkai 
with other organizations active in the same period such as the Tōyō Kyōkai, the 
Tōa Dōbunkai and the research department of the South Manchurian Railway 
Company. This will also provide for a better understanding of the place of the 
Nanyō Kyōkai in history, as well as aspects of its development that resulted 
directly from the specific nature of Japan’s interaction with Southeast Asia which 
changed over the period under study.
           As a product of Japan’s age of empire and a witness to modern Japan’s 
interactions with Southeast Asia, a region it referred to as the Nanyō, the South 
Seas for much of the time period covered in this study, the Nanyō Kyōkai’s 
history is not just of interest in itself, but also in terms of the light its sheds on 
aspects of Japanese and regional history.  Having began as an organization 
devoted to the promotion of economic interaction, becoming at various times one 
or all of the aforementioned descriptions, and finally participant in the 
administration of Japan’s wartime empire, the Nanyō Kyōkai has had an 
intriguing history, and a legacy that apparently continues to be of relevance today, 
in the form of an organization, the Intercultural Communication Foundation (異文
化コミュニケーション財団 , ICF) claiming to have its roots in the Nanyō 
Kyōkai, despite the gap of over fifty years that separates the dissolution of the 
Nanyō Kyōkai  at the end of WWII and the ICF’s emergence in 1999. 
1Chapter One: Introduction
           The Nanyō Kyōkai (South Seas Association 南洋協会) was a semi-private, 
semi-governmental organization that existed from 1915 to 1945. Its founding was 
a direct result of the greater interest in the region known to the Japanese as the 
South Seas, a region that more or less corresponds to present day Southeast Asia 
due to the tremendous increase in trade between Japan and the region as the Great 
War created an economic vacuum by disrupting trade between the area and 
Europe. As an association founded with the aim of conducting research about the 
South Seas, develop the region and further ties between the region and Japan, the 
Nanyō Kyōkai disbanded after the Second World War, its mission and activities 
no longer of relevance in the context of drastically altered relations between Japan 
and the region resulting from the experience of war and occupation.1  
          Over its thirty year existence, the activities of the association and the 
content of its publications underwent changes as the nature of the Japanese 
government’s interest in the South Seas region altered and Japan’s interaction 
with the region took on different forms. The circumstances in which the 
association carried out their research and publishing activities is of particular 
interest for this dissertation, because while there have been numerous studies on 
the colonial production of knowledge with regards to the activities of the 
European imperialists, there has been considerably less study of similar activities 
                                                          
1 Horiguchi Masao, Nanyō Kyōkai nijūnenshi 南洋協会二十年史 (Tokyo: Nanyō Kyōkai, 1935), 
p. 6.
2carried out by the Japanese in their colonies in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, as 
well as in China during a period when China’s status can be described as that of a 
semi-colonial state.  Japanese production of knowledge in the South Seas has 
similarly received scant academic attention, if not even lesser than Japanese 
activities in the aforementioned places. It is with this area of Japanese activity that 
this dissertation will primarily be interested in.  A study of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s
knowledge producing activities also sheds light on another aspect of Japan’s 
Southward advance—connections between government policy and associations 
such as the Nanyō Kyōkai,  especially since the association had close ties to the 
Japanese government, particularly the Taiwan colonial government.2 To what 
extent can associations such as the Nanyō Kyōkai be considered an advance guard 
of the southward advance, and the degree to which its research activities can be 
considered guided by the Japanese government, or conversely, how much did they 
influence government policy are also issues to be discussed.               
            In addition, Japanese production of knowledge in the South Seas as 
undertaken by the Nanyō Kyōkai during this period further begs the intriguing 
question of whether it might constitute a different model of knowledge production, 
differing from that carried out by colonial governments in the territories under 
their control, or in leased territories in China. As the region with the exception of 
Siam were colonies of the European powers,  the research staff of the Nanyō 
Kyōkai were operating in territory under administrations that frequently viewed 
                                                          
2 The office of the Taiwan branch of the Nanyō Kyōkai was located in the same building as the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, the seat of administrative power in the colony.  Significant 
funding was also given by the Taiwan colonial government, and certain officials were actively 
involved in the Association.
3Japanese activities with varying degrees of suspicion. Moreover, as Japanese 
interest in the region altered as the decades wore on, from being mainly interested 
in economic penetration and expansion to a keener interest in territorial expansion 
and conquest, and finally war, conquest and occupation, the nature of the 
information collected and disseminated by the Nanyō Kyōkai also underwent 
changes, even to the extent of being involved in the project of managing Japan’s 
wartime empire in the South Seas and publishing materials justifying the actions 
of the Japanese government. This dissertation will explore this question through 
an examination of the association’s activities pertaining to the producing and 
dissemination of information, as well as the publications of the association.              
             Before delving into the above-mentioned aspect, this chapter will present
an overview of existing literature on the Nanyō Kyōkai. For an organization with 
a relatively long history and which had been very active in conducting research 
and publishing information on the South Seas, extant studies of the Nanyō Kyōkai
are far from numerous. This is in spite of it being the largest and oldest Japanese 
association concerned with South Seas affairs in its time, and assessments which 
see it as indispensible to an understanding of Japanese interactions with the region 
in the first half of the twentieth century.3 While its publications and materials it 
generated have been used by scholars studying aspects of Japan’s historical 
interaction with its Asian neighbours during the first half of the twentieth century, 
                                                          
3 Kawaharabayashi Naoto. “Teikoku Nihon no ekkyō suru shakai teki jinmyaku—Nanyō Kyōkai 
to iu kagami 帝国日本の越境する社会的人脈・南洋協会という鏡” in Nanyō guntō to 
teikoku—kokusai chitsujo南洋群島と帝国・国際秩序, ed. Asano Toyomi (Tokyo: Jigakusha 
shuppan, 2007), p.101.
4there has been little interest in the Association’s history, especially with regards to 
the nature of its research and knowledge producing activities.  
            The Nanyō Kyōkai’s name appears in many works dealing with Japanese 
activities in Southeast Asia in the first half of the twentieth century, but such 
mention is either brief, with the Association’s history and activities summarized 
into one or two sentences, or mentioned now and then when its activities are 
tangential to discussion of a broader topic. Articles focusing on particular aspects 
of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s history have also been published, but only two articles 
discuss and assess the Nanyō Kyōkai’s history and activities in a comprehensive 
manner. These are Japanese academic Akashi Yoji’s “Nanyō Kyōkai 1915-1945” 
and Hyung Gu Lynn’s “A Comparative Study of the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nanyō 
Kyōkai”. They are also the only works to devote attention to the association’s 
activities in research, publication and education.
             Akashi Yōji’s article, published only in 1994, almost half a century after 
the Nanyō Kyōkai had ceased to exist, is demonstrative of the general lack of 
academic interest in the organization. Akashi himself mentions the paucity of 
research on the Nanyō Kyōkai, despite the important role he perceives the 
Association to have played in Japan’s nanshin (Southward advance or movement) 
from 1912 to 1945, particularly in terms of disseminating information on the 
region and training personnel for commercial activities.4 He attempts to fill this 
gap with his article, clearly stating that the aims of his study were two-fold—to 
                                                          
4 Akashi Yōji, “Nanyō Kyōkai 1915-1945”, Shakai Kagaku Tōkyū社会科学討究, 40, 2 
(December 1994), p. 1. 
5outline the Association’s wide range of activities and to assess its importance in 
Japan’s overseas commercial expansion and the Southward advance. 5 His article 
provides a very good overview of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s history, as well as some 
assessment of its activities and its significance in generating interest in the South 
Seas. Akashi argues that research and publication formed the major part of the 
Nanyō Kyōkai’s numerous projects, its importance enhanced by the lack of any 
similar groups devoted to studying the South Seas during the Taishō period 
(1912-1926). 6 The Association also undertook lobbying efforts on behalf of 
Japanese businesses in the region. Akashi also touches on the educational 
activities of the Association, as part of their objective to train and send talent to 
the South Seas to engage in trade. Akashi ends with the assessment that the 
Nanyō Kyōkai had been a very important factor in Japan’s economic expansion 
into the South Seas, with the vast quantity of information it had collected useful 
for those looking into business opportunities or emigration in the region.7
           Hyung Gu Lynn’s article similarly informs about the Nanyō Kyōkai while 
simultaneously providing meaningful analysis, although it differs from Akashi’s 
work in several ways, most obviously in terms of Hyung’s approach of comparing 
the Nanyō Kyōkai with the Tōyō Kyōkai( East Asia Association 東洋協会).8  He 




8 The Tōyō Kyōkai was first founded as the Taiwankai, an informal group consisting of those who 
had previously worked or traveled in Taiwan. At its second meeting the decision was made to turn
it into a formal association, and it was renamed the Taiwan Kyōkai in April 1898 with the mission 
of promoting economic activity and providing information for the colonial project in Taiwan. Its 
membership profile was similar to the Nanyō Kyōkai, consisting of politicians, bureaucrats and 
businessmen. As Japan expanded into Korea and Manchuria, the Taiwan Kyōkai expanded its 
scope of activities to these territories, and revised its name to Tōyō Kyōkai to reflect its expanded 
6also presents arguments and perspectives that were not discussed by other 
scholars who have written on the Nanyō Kyōkai. Presenting his aim of analyzing 
the roles of these two organizations in terms of their roles and significance in 
domestic politics and Japan’s interactions with its Asian neighbours, Hyung’s 
discussion of both associations is comprehensive, covering their organizational 
structures, resources, information collecting and disseminating activities, 
educational programmes, lobbying efforts and the role of personal networks, and 
also the issue of generational change in leadership, which he perceives as the key 
factor in organizational decline in the 1930s.9 However, his comparative approach 
for an article that is not much longer than Akashi’s means that certain subjects are 
not covered in similar depth, and what is covered does not provide much factual 
information differing from that provided by Akashi. 
           Other works on the Nanyō Kyōkai are those that discuss it from the 
perspective of a particular aspect of its activities. One example will be 
Kawaharabayashi Naoto’s article “Nanyō Kyōkai to nanshin seisaku—nanyō 
keizai kondankai ni miru rigai kankei (南洋協会と南進政策――南洋経済懇談
会に観る利害関係)”. The Conference on South Seas Economic Affairs (南洋経
済懇談会) can be seen as another form of the Association’s lobbying activities, 
since it adopted resolutions intended to influence the government’s policies on the 
South Seas. 10 Held from 14th to 23rd September 1939 in Tokyo, Osaka and 
                                                                                                                                                              
scope of activity.  Hyung Gu Lynn, “A comparative study of the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nanyō 
Kyōkai”. in the Japanese Empire in East Asia and its Postwar Legacy, ed.  Harald Fuess 
(München : Iudicium, 1998),  pp. 68-69.
9Ibid., pp.66, 68.
10 Akashi, p.13.
7Nagoya, resolutions adopted by the Conference included the reorganization and 
integration of existing research institutions into a single organization that could 
formulate appropriate policies pertaining to the South Seas, and extending the 
period of overseas assignment for diplomatic and representatives from trading 
companies so as to deepen their knowledge and ability to react appropriately to 
changing circumstances. 11 Kawaharabayashi’s article concentrates on the 
divergent and dissonant voices regarding the nature of the southward advance that 
can be perceived from the organization of the conference and the opinions 
expressed by its participants—for instance the objections to the Conference 
voiced by diplomats and businessmen in the South Seas, and not so much the 
linkages between the South Seas Association and nanshin, but he nonetheless 
presents valid, and rather damning comments on the nature of the organization.  
             Kawaharabayashi has also written another article discussing the Nanyō 
Kyōkai in relation to Japan’s overseas expansion.  Titled “Teikoku Nihon no 
ekkyō suru shakai teki jinmyaku—Nanyō Kyōkai to iu kagami(帝国日本の越境
する社会的な人脈・南洋協会という鏡)”, this article provides a very good 
overview of the activities and conditions surrounding the organization’s founding, 
such as assurances of non-encroachment into its functions made to the Tōyō 
Kyōkai. 12 It also gives a concise picture of its connections with the Taiwan 
Colonial Government and later, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as 
how it progressively became a tool of national policy after the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese war. Financial dependence on government aid is clearly 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Kawaharabayashi, “Teikoku Nihon no ekkyō suru shakai teki jinmyaku”, p.106.
8and accurately pointed out as key to these changes the association underwent and 
its inability to remain independent towards the end of its history. 
          Studies dealing with perceptions of the South Seas in modern Japanese 
thought are another area of scholarship that mentions the Nanyō Kyōkai as part of 
a wider discussion. Examples include Shimizu Hajime’s Southeast Asia in 
Modern Japanese Thought: The Development and Transformation of “Nanshin 
Ron”, Yano Tōru’s Nanshin no keifu (南進の系譜), and Lydia N. Yu-Jose’s 
Japan Views the Philippines: 1900-1944.
          Shimizu’s Southeast Asia in Modern Japanese Thought covers the growing 
interest in the South Seas and the changing nature of the term “nanshin” from the 
Meiji era to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, and it is in his discussion of 
the “South Seas fever” during WWI and continued Japanese interest in the region
despite the cooling of this fever that the Nanyō Kyōkai comes into the story. 
Shimizu characterizes the period from 1919-1930 as one in which fervor for 
southward advance was not apparent as compared to the situation during WWI, 
but continued to exist in the less visible manner of research on the region 
undertaken by official and semi-official organizations.13 The Nanyō Kyōkai was 
mentioned together with the Taiwan Colonial Government as the main parties that 
generated research reports covering almost all aspects of the South Seas. 14
Shimizu goes on to narrate the Association’s founding by prominent personalities, 
                                                          
13 Shimizu Hajime, Southeast Asia in Modern Japanese Thought: The Development and 
Transformation of “Nanshin Ron” (Canberra: Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History, 
Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1980), p.33.
14 Ibid., pp.33-34.
9its objectives, briefly list the Association’s activities such as publishing its in-
house journal, holding lecture meetings on the region and language classes, and 
the opening and maintaining of commercial museums. 15 Although Shimizu’s 
discussion of the Association is very brief his argument that it kept the concept of 
southward advance alive is interesting, though it could have been further 
elaborated. 
         Yano Tōru’s work, published 5 years before Shimizu’s, covers similar 
ground as it is also concerned with tracing the origins and development of 
nanshin. It is in his discussion of nanshin in the Taisho era that the founding of 
the Nanyō Kyōkai is mentioned as one of two events that cannot be ignored, the 
other being the ‘South Seas boom” stirred up by the mass media with the journal 
Industrial and Business Japan (実業の日本) at its centre.16  Most of Yano’s brief 
discussion of the Association is a retelling of the early history consisting of its 
founding in 1915 after the failed attempt two years ago, the prominent 
personalities among its founding members, its objectives, and its activities such as 
the opening of museums, publications, holding language courses and so on.17 His 
assessment of the organization is that in the twenty years following its founding, 
its continued activities concerning the South Seas played the important historical 
role of transmitting the ethos of nanshin that had begun in the Meiji period to the 
Showa era, and therein lays its historical significance.18  Therefore, while Yano 
                                                          
15 Ibid., pp.34-35.
16 Yano Tōru, Nanshin no keifu  南進の系譜 (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1975), p.73.
17 Ibid., pp.76-77.
18 Ibid., p. 77.
10
does not discuss the Association in detail, his argument is worth keeping in mind 
in an assessment of the Association’s knowledge producing activities.    
          Lydia N. Yu-Jose’s Japan Views the Philippines, as its title indicate, deals 
with Japanese perception of the Philippines in particular, though it also naturally 
touches on the broader aspect of Japanese perceptions of the region. The Nanyō 
Kyōkai is first discussed in her chapter on semi-official perceptions, with a brief 
introduction of its founding and its aims, before delving into the Association’s 
articles and activities pertaining to the Philippines.  She briefly mentions the 
Association’s inviting of people who had been to the Philippines to give lectures 
or share their experiences, before discussing in greater detail what was written 
about the Philippines in articles published by the Association’s journal.19 She then 
singles out a few articles for further discussion, articles that can be seen to have 
resulted from the fact that the Philippines had the largest Japanese immigrant 
community in the South Seas. While Yu-Jose’s work does not assess the 
significance of the Association, her discussion of the articles published in the 
Nanyō Kyōkai’s journal and the views expressed in the Conference on Nanyō 
Economic Affairs is an example of the kind of information published and 
disseminated by the Association, as well as the sources of such knowledge and 
their relation to events and circumstances in reality. Although her discussion is 
brief and limited to the Philippine context, it has provided ideas for this 
dissertation that seeks to examine the Association’s knowledge producing 
activities.  
                                                          
19 Lydia N. Yu-Jose, Japan views the Philippines, 1900-1944 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 1999), pp. 42-43.
11
          The Nanyō Kyōkai is frequently mentioned in works discussing Japan’s 
economic expansion into the region during this period.  Examples of monographs 
would be Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi’s Japan and Singapore in the 
World Economy: Japan’s Economic Advance into Singapore 1870-1965 and Hara 
Fujio’s Eiryō maraya no nihonjin (英領マラヤの日本人).
           Shimizu and Hirakawa’s monograph mentions the Association briefly, 
which is only to be expected given the much wider scope of the book in terms of 
both topic and time frame.  However, even within the brief mention of the Nanyō 
Kyōkai, the Association and its activities are assessed as factors in the expansion 
of Japanese economic activities in Singapore, and with regards to the commercial 
training programme aimed at reducing the impact of Chinese boycotts on 
Japanese business, assessed according to the impact it had. In their discussion of 
the expansion of Japanese trading activities with Singapore during the First World 
War and the interwar period, Shimizu and Hirakawa listed the Nanyō Kyōkai as 
an institutional factor contributing to this expansion, with the establishment of a 
commercial museum in Singapore mentioned specifically.20  The other time the 
Nanyō Kyōkai is discussed by Shimizu and Hirakawa is with regards to the 
commercial training scheme run jointly by the Japanese government and the 
Nanyō Kyōkai with the aim of increasing the number of Japanese retailers in the 
region, thereby reducing the negative impact of Chinese boycotts on Japanese 
businesses.21 While Shimizu and Hirakawa’s brief mention of the Nanyō Kyōkai
                                                          
20 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi, Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan’s 
Economic Advance into Singapore 1870-1965 (London: Routledge, 1999), p.71.
21 Ibid., p.86.
12
is not particularly informative, which is not something to be expected from their 
book which deals with a much broader topic, their mention of it demonstrates an 
appreciation of the Association’s importance in the history of Japan’s commercial 
expansion into Singapore and its efforts to promote Japanese business interests in 
the region.
          Hara Fujio’s monograph traces the economic history of the Japanese in 
British Malaya, and it is in this context that he discusses the Nanyō Kyōkai’s 
efforts to promote Japanese immigration and agriculture in Malaya. In his chapter 
on the phase of Japanese economic immigration during which immigrants set up 
small scale agricultural enterprises in Malaya, he refers to articles published in the 
Nanyō Kyōkai’s journal to discuss the Association’s views on the issue. Hara also 
traces the involvement of the Association in a feasibility study for emigration 
ordered by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, but under strict instructions to keep 
the involvement of the Ministry secret, probably to avoid arousing British 
suspicions. 22 Nanyō Kyōkai’s involvement in the project to settle migrant 
Japanese in the Cameron Highlands is the next area of activity that Hara discusses. 
Hara’s work thus provides an insight into the Nanyō Kyōkai’s role in Japanese 
economic activities in British Malaya during the interwar period.                       
              Mention of the Nanyō Kyōkai can also be found in, sometimes 
unexpectedly, in works that do not deal with the Association, but which have 
mined its publications for information on Japanese activities in the South Seas 
                                                          
22 Hara Fujio, Eiryō maraya no nihonjin英領マラヤの日本人 (Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyūjo, 
1986), p. 75. 
13
region and tensions arising from Japanese expansionism in mainland China. Three
examples would be Akashi Yoji’s The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement, 1937-1941, Kuo Huei-Ying’s article “Rescuing Businesses through 
Transnationalism: Embedded Chinese Enterprise and Nationalist Activities in 
Singapore in the 1930s Great Depression” and Shiraishi Takashi’s article “Eiryō 
maraya no nihonjin gomuen ni okeru rōdōsha—[nanyō kyōkai Zasshi] o chūshin 
ni” ( 英領マラヤの日本人ゴム園における労働者――「南洋協会雑誌」を
中心に). Akashi’s more comprehensive article on the Association has been 
discussed earlier, but here he only mentions the Nanyō Kyōkai in an endnote of 
the first chapter of this book published a good 24 years before his article on the
Nanyō Kyōkai, describing the Association as a government –subsidized 
association ostensibly involved in the gathering and dissemination of trade 
information, but was also involved in collecting intelligence for the Japanese 
military.23 He further mentions that its trade office in Singapore was investigated 
in January 1939 by the Singapore police, which also summoned a few of its staff 
for questioning and confiscated some documents. 24
            Kuo’s article, which deals with a similar topic as Akashi’s work,  namely  
Chinese nationalistic activities in the economic realm carried out by the overseas 
Chinese community, drew upon issues of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s monthly journal for 
information on such activities. Research and statistics collected and disseminated 
by the Association regarding anti-Japanese economic activities as well as 
                                                          
23 Akashi Yōji. The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941 (Center for East 
Asian studies, The University of Kansas, 1970), p.171.
24 Ibid.
14
competition between Japanese imports and local Chinese manufacturers in the 
local rubber-soled shoe market were drawn upon by Kuo for this article.25   The 
Nanyō Kyōkai was described as “an ad hoc Japanese intelligence organ” for 
economic expansion in the South Seas, while an article in its journal dealing with 
the anti-Japanese boycotts in 1919 was described as an “intelligence report”. 26
             Such brief mention of the Nanyō Kyōkai in both of these works are not 
particularly informative with regards to the Association, but they do provide 
examples of how the Association is viewed by scholars, who when required to 
describe the Nanyō Kyōkai in a nutshell in the course of informing readers about 
the source of their information, refer to its intelligence gathering activities, though 
differing in the degree to which they consider such activities as definitive of the 
organization.  
           Shiraishi’s article mainly uses the Journal of the Nanyō Kyōkai as source 
material to study aspects of labour in Japanese-owned rubber plantations, is not 
focused on the Association and thus provides little information about it besides 
some insight to the contents of the Association’s journal and its usefulness as a 
historical document. Issues covered by Shiraishi include terms of employment, 
changes in the conditions of labourers across races, their consciousness and 
                                                          
25 Kuo Huei-Ying. “Rescuing Businesses through Transnationalism: Embedded Chinese 
Enterprise and Nationalist Activities in Singapore in the 1930s Great Depression” in Enterprise 
and Society, 7, 1 (March 2006), pp.99, 110-111.
26 Ibid, p.99, footnote 3.
15
movements regarding these changes, their perception of the Japanese, as well as 
characteristics of Japanese-owned plantations.27
              While the exact extent to which the Nanyō Kyōkai engaged in espionage 
as part of their activities is near impossible to ascertain, two works on Japanese 
espionage in the region in the interwar era specifically mention the Association as 
involved in intelligence gathering and even acts of sabotage. Besides the 
similarity in content, both books can be described as products of colonial 
government in terms of their authors and source material.
             The first of these two books is a slim volume, first published by the 
Netherlands Information Bureau in 1942, and reprinted in 1944. Titled Ten years 
of Japanese burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies-- Official report of the 
Netherlands East Indies Government on Japanese subversive activities in the 
archipelago during the last decade, it is a work that in tone and content reveals 
the historical context in which it was compiled and published. While its 
presentation of an extremely rosy view of Dutch colonial rule in the East Indies 
can be expected, being a piece of wartime propaganda after all,  its indictment of 
all Japanese in the territory as actively involved in subversion and espionage 
verges on extreme paranoia. The Nanyō Kyōkai was mentioned as an example of 
Japanese espionage conducted under a false front.  This volume probably reflects 
the mindset of the Dutch government and its insecurities over its empire more 
than providing a good overview of Japanese activities in the Dutch East Indies. Its 
                                                          
27 Shiraishi Takashi, “Eiryō maraya no nihonjin gomuen ni okeru rōdōsha—[nanyō kyōkai Zasshi] 
wo chūshin ni 英領マラヤの日本人ゴム園における労働者――「南洋協会雑誌」を中心
に”, in Tōyōshi Kenkyuu Shitsupō  東洋史研究室報, Vol.11（1989.10）pp.11-23.
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brief mention of the Nanyō Kyōkai does not provide much information about the 
organization, and what it mentions is impossible to verify, but it does give an 
example of the suspicion with which European colonial officials perceived the 
Japanese and the atmosphere in which Nanyō Kyōkai research activities had to be 
conducted.  It also brings one to consider the boundaries of the term ‘espionage’, 
and the activities that can be defined as acts of espionage. Incidentally, the next 
book to be discussed specifically addresses this question.
                 The second work that discusses the Nanyō Kyōkai in the context of 
Japanese espionage in the region is Eric Robertson’s The Japanese File: Pre-war 
Japanese penetration in Southeast Asia. Written by a former member of the 
Straits Settlements’ security forces based on a file compiled by the Straits 
Settlements’ police on Japanese espionage, the Nanyō Kyōkai is described as part 
of a hidden system of Japanese infiltration that operated behind the mask of 
legitimate economic and diplomatic initiatives.28 With regards to the issue of what 
constituted espionage, Robertson puts forth the argument that espionage had to be 
understood in broader terms than the limited definition prevalent throughout the 
West, that it was both impossible and undesirable from a security perspective to 
separate any form of overseas commercial activity conducted by the Japanese 
from the “all-pervading espionage system”.29   The function of this espionage 
system was described as the collection of detailed information on every 
imaginable subject, and it is in this aspect that the Nanyō Kyōkai probably 
                                                          
28 Eric Robertson, The Japanese File: Pre-war Japanese penetration in Southeast Asia (Hong 
Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979), p.6.
29 Ibid., p. 7. 
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seemed particularly suspicious to security forces of the European colonial 
authorities.30 Robertson’s book does not provide a great deal of information on 
the Association, but it is significant in providing a glimpse of the fears and 
suspicion with which the Japanese in the region were perceived by British 
colonial security personnel in general, as well as how the Nanyō Kyōkai and its 
activities were viewed in particular.                 
With this understanding of existing scholarship on the Nanyō Kyōkai and 
the way in which the Japanese overseas community were perceived, this study 
moves on to discuss the Japanese interest in the region, and how it changed with 
the passage of time to better understand how the Nanyō Kyōkai and its knowledge 
producing activities fitted into the broader historical context.  More specifically, 
this thesis seeks to illuminate changes and continuities in the association’s 
activities over its existence, its role in the southward advance and how it 
compares with other colonial or semi-colonial organizations that engaged in 
similar activities, many of which preceded the Nanyō Kyōkai in their 
establishment and continued to function in the same inter-war period in which the 
Nanyō Kyōkai was active.
This thesis will utilize a selection of primary and secondary sources in 
both Japanese and English languages. The over 100 publications of the Nanyō 
Kyōkai constitute the bulk of the Japanese language primary sources, consisting 
of selections from its monthly journals, monographs, official histories as well as 
                                                          
30 Ibid.
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wartime pamphlets.31 These sources provide insights to the knowledge producing 
activities of the association, not only in their contents but also their tone, context 
and topics. Reference will also be made to a memoir by a former participant of 
one of the educational cum talent developing programmes run by the association. 
These publications can be found in many libraries worldwide; the NUS Japanese 
language collection has a couple of them, some of which are recent reprints, for 
instance Nanyō Kyōkai nijūnenshi (南洋協会二十年史)was a 2002 reprint while 
others such as Nanyō kōsan shigen (南洋鉱産資源) are originals dating between 
1916 to the 1940s. A few issues of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s journal from various years 
can also be found in the NUS central library, but are insufficient to form an idea 
of the journal’s changes, totaling less than the 12 issues that would have equaled a 
single volume, when 29 volumes of the journal was published between 1915 and 
late 1944. The most complete collection of the journals, as well as copies of those 
published by overseas commercial museums in Java and Singapore before being 
absorbed into the main journal can be found in the library of the Institute of 
Developing Economies in Makuhari, Chiba Prefecture, as well as a good selection 
of assorted publications ranging from monographs to dictionaries. The National 
Diet Library in Tokyo does not have a similarly substantial collection of the 
Nanyō Kyōkai’s publications, but is valuable in its possession of propaganda 
materials put out by the association following the outbreak of the second Sino-
                                                          
31 It is very difficult to ascertain the total publication output of the Nanyō Kyōkai over its thirty-
year history. Akashi gives a count of 99 titles by 1935 in page 5 of his article, excluding the in-
house journal. This number corresponds with the sum of the combined publishing output of the
Nanyō Kyōkai’s Tokyo headquarters and the Taiwan branch as presented in Horiguchi’s Nanyō
Kyōkai nijūnenshi, pp. 160-161,339-341. The precise number of new titles published between 
1935 and 1945, as well as the numbers that survived the upheaval of war and the ensuing post-war 
decades before serious study of the association’s history was undertaken are unknown.
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Japanese War, and a Japanese language textbook that was used in present day 
South East Asia during Japan’s occupation of the region from 1941 to 1945. 
However a complete set of the association’s journals or publications do not seem 
to be located at any single institution and even the collections of the above 
institutions are incomplete, lacking particular volumes, issues and sometimes 
missing pages. 
English language primary sources are considerably lesser in quantity when 
compared to those in the Japanese language. These include, in brief, certain 
publications of the association that were partially in English, a memoir by a 
former police officer of the Straits Settlements’ security forces and a pamphlet put 
out by the Netherlands government regarding Japanese espionage in the South 
Seas in the interwar era.
Secondary sources consulted for this thesis in both the Japanese and 
English languages cover a wide range of topics. Some of these sources discuss 
and assess various aspects of the Nanyō Kyōkai, while others provide information 
on the nanshin movement which formed the shifting historical context in which 
the Nanyō Kyōkai came into being, operated and changed. Studies of other 
Japanese organizations that share similarities with the Nanyō Kyōkai, such as the 
Tōyō Kyōkai, as well as studies of the production of knowledge undertaken by 
both the European and Japanese imperial states in their respective colonies will 
also be drawn upon in the historical assessment of the Nanyō Kyōkai and its 
activities. 
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This assessment of the Nanyō Kyōkai will adopt a chronological and 
thematic approach to illustrate how the nature and activities of the organization 
changed with the course of time and political circumstances, as well as the aspects 
that remained unchanged till the end. In accordance with how major shifts in 
global political circumstances and the waxing and waning of domestic Japanese 
interest in the region from 1915 to 1945 can approximately be traced over decade-
long periods, the following chapters will each cover, with some adjustments, a 
decade of the association’s history.     
The founding and development of the Nanyō Kyōkai in its first decade 
constitutes the focus of the following chapter. The forms in which Japanese 
interest in the South Seas were expressed before the founding of the association, 
the conditions that brought about the Nanyō Kyōkai’s formation, its 
organizational structure, characteristics of its membership and the projects it 
embarked upon in the first ten years will be covered in this chapter.
           Continuity and change in the second decade of the association’s history 
will be covered in chapter three, which looks at the association’s knowledge 
producing activities between 1926 and 1936, as well as connections between such 
activities and government networks and policies. Being a period which saw the 
revival of nanshin-ron after a long period of general disinterest in the region in 
both public and government quarters that had begun after the end of WWI, this 
chapter looks at how the association evolved in this period as it continued its 
efforts to stir up interest in the South Seas. The Nanyō Kyōkai will be compared 
and contrasted with other Japanese organizations that engaged in similar activities
21
not limited to knowledge producing, in order to assess the Nanyō Kyōkai in its 
proper historical context. Comparison with similar European organizations and 
agencies will not be included, due to considerations of time, space and different 
historical circumstances that would take too much time to discuss thoroughly, as 
well as the fact that Western efforts in this arena has been extensively studied, 
unlike the case of the Japanese. 32
           The last years of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s activities saw it take on new and 
additional roles as war broke out between Japan and China in 1937 and later 
expanded into the South Seas. As government interest in the Nanyō intensified 
and government policy towards the region changed drastically, the association, 
with its close connections to the government was unavoidably roped into 
propaganda efforts and later, language teaching and specialist training 
programmes in the conquered territories. This period from 1937 to 1945 saw the 
association take on active roles in new realms far beyond its original mission, but 
it also resulted in the end of the association together with Japan’s military defeat. 
Chapter four explores this final period of the association’s history, leading on to 
the conclusion.
           Japan’s main trade and political concerns has traditionally been focused on 
its East Asian neighbours, but interest in and interactions with the South Seas 
polities have not been nonexistent. Geographical proximity has made for 
                                                          
32 Notable among such scholarship would be articles in Orientalism and the Postcolonial 
Predicament, ed.  Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, especially David Ludden’s 
“ Orientalist Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial Knowledge” and Arjun Appadurai’s 
“ Number in the Colonial Imagination”,  Nicholas Dirks’s Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the 
Making of Modern India, and  Omnia El Shakry’s, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of 
knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt. 
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interactions between Japan and the region that date back several hundred years, 
but Japan’s interest in studying the region has a much shorter history, with its 
beginnings in the mid-Edo period.33 It has been stated that Japan’s interest in the 
region in the pre-Meiji period was primarily driven by the twin imperatives of 
economic and defense considerations, yet it would seem that such a description 
would hold true until the end of the Pacific War, with any scholarly interest in the 
region largely overshadowed by or even inseparable from knowledge generating 
activities in service of similar aims, be it trade expansion, immigration promotion 
or imperial expansion. 34 The kind of information collected and disseminated by 
the Nanyō Kyōkai can be said to have fallen into all of the above categories. It is 
to a discussion of Japanese interest in the South Seas, referred to as Nanshin-ron, 
and the origins of the Nanyō Kyōkai that the next chapter turns to. 
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34 Lydia N. Yu-Jose and Ricardo Trota Jose, “The Development of Southeast Asian Studies in 
Japan: Changes in Scope, Focus and Approach”, in Japanese Contributions to Southeast Asian 




Looking Southward: Japanese interest in the South Seas and the origins and 
early development of the Nanyō Kyōkai
              31st January 1915 was the founding day of the Nanyō Kyōkai, though the 
origins of the organization can be traced to an earlier group formed in 1912, the 
Nanyō Kondankai, which had rapidly fallen into inactivity and financial woes 
leading to its dissolution.
1 The main reason for  the Nanyo Kondankai’s brief existence, as concluded by 
its founders who thought it best to dissolve the organization in 1913, was that the 
time was not yet ripe for an organization that sought to stir up interest in the South 
Seas.2  The second attempt at the formation of a similar organization in the form 
of the Nanyō Kyōkai a mere two years later, created an entity that lasted thirty 
years and was even capable of establishing branches throughout the South Seas. 
             What were the reasons behind such a marked difference in the histories of 
these two organizations?  The main reason was changed historical circumstances 
                                                          
1Akashi Yōji, “Nanyō Kyōkai 1915-1945”, Shakai Kagaku Tōkyū 社会科学討究, 40, 2 
(December 1994), pp. 1-2. An earlier grouping, also called the Nanyō Kyōkai was apparently 
founded either in 1885 or 1886 by former Vice- Admiral, Naval Minister and then Minister of 
Communications Enomoto Takeaki and Yōkō Tosaku, who was then Chief of the Record Section 
at the Metropolitan Police Office, with aims of research, lobbying and promoting emigration not 
dissimilar to the more well-known Nanyō Kyōkai that was founded in 1915. It is unclear what 
resulted from the mid-1880s grouping, but neither the Nanyō Kyōkai under study in this 
dissertation nor historians of the topic makes a connection between the two groups. Josefa M. 
Saniel, Japan and the Philippines: 1868-1898 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1962), 
p.82-83; Mark R. Peattie, Nan’yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp.7, 22.
2Akashi Yōji, “Nanyō Kyōkai 1915-1945”, p.2.
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that had taken place in the space of the two years after the dissolution of the first 
incarnation of the Nanyō Kyōkai, particularly the outbreak of the Great War in 
Europe. What did the Nanyō Kyōkai perceive as its mission, and how was its 
fulfillment attempted? This chapter will explore these questions, looking at the 
Nanyō Kyōkai’s activities in different realms and their characteristics in its first 
ten years, which set the tone for its future development. 
             Before delving into the history of the association, an overview of 
Japanese interest in the region is of relevance. The Nanyō Kyōkai being an 
expression of Japanese interest in the region, knowledge of the development of 
such interest and their manifestations prior to the founding of the Nanyō Kyōkai 
enables its understanding within this historical context and as part of a historical 
process instead of an isolated event.  
Looking southwards: Japanese interest in the nanyō and its expressions
           Interactions between Japan and the polities of the South Seas are said to 
have existed for centuries, but the appearance of what scholars have referred to as 
“nanshin-ron (南進論) ”, loosely translated as opinions regarding the southward 
advance, of which the Nanyō Kyōkai was both product and contributor, dates to 
the mid-Meiji era. This is the central reason for this thesis’ focus on the interest 
demonstrated in Japan regarding the South Seas from the mid-1880s onwards in 
tracing the roots of the Nanyō Kyōkai. Nonetheless, a brief discussion of an
earlier period would be useful in providing information about the state of 
Japanese interest in the region before the advent of nanshin theories towards the 
middle of the Meiji period. 
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              Scholars writing on Japanese studies of Southeast Asia who have written 
on pre-Meiji Japanese interest in the South Seas have tended to differentiate 
between academic interest and interest driven by economic or defense 
considerations. 3 However, even in their overviews of the topic, there is
acknowledgment that what they term “academic” or “scientific” studies were 
products, directly or indirectly, of increased interactions, often in the economic 
sphere. 
              Japanese interest in studying the region is said to have begun in the mid-
Edo period, when descriptions of places such as Tonkin, Malacca and Patani were 
included in works devoted to the geography of foreign lands with which Japan 
had had trading relations in the past, such as Nishikawa Joken’s Zōho Ka- I 
Tsūshōkō (増補華夷通商考), published in 1708. 4  Later works in the Edo period 
that mentioned places in present day Southeast Asia include two works by Kondō 
Morishige in the early 1800s – an annotated compilation of diplomatic 
correspondence between Japan and foreign countries from 1569 to 1614,  and a 
two-volume work on Annam’s history, geography and products.5  Another work 
on Japan’s foreign relations, Tsūkō Ichiran (通航一覧 ), also sees attention 
devoted to the region in the form of approximately eleven volumes of this 
                                                          
3 Wada Hisanori, “Development of Japanese Studies in Southeast Asian History”, in Japan and 
South East Asia, Volume I, ed. Wolf Mendl (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.11-13, 20;  Lydia N. 
Yu-Jose and Ricardo Trota Jose, “The Development of Southeast Asian Studies in Japan: Changes 
in Scope, Focus and Approach”, in Japanese Contributions to Southeast Asian Studies: A 
Research Guide, ed. Shiro Saito (Ann Arbor, Michigan : Association for Asian Studies, 2006), 
pp.3-5.
4 Wada, “Development of Japanese Studies in Southeast Asian History”, p.11.
5 Ibid., pp.11-12.
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massive 350- volume series. 6 This work was a collection of documents, 
descriptions and histories of foreign lands which had dealings with Japan between 
1566 and the late Edo period completed by twelve scholars in 1853. 7 Wada 
attributes the existence of these works to interactions between the region and 
Japan, in the form of trade and emigration in the early Edo period, and, after the 
adoption of the closed-door policy, continued in the form of Japanese castaways 
and Chinese merchant ships making their way to Japan from the South Seas.8
Besides the linkage between the region and Japan provided by the Chinese ships, 
there were also other connections such as that between the Thai polity of 
Ayutthaya and Japan made before the implementation of the closed-door policy 
and not completely broken.9 This was evident in records of official and semi-
official correspondence between the two governments between 1606 and 1687, as 
well as records of Japanese ships docking at Ayutthaya until 1615 and Ayutthayan 
ships arriving at Nagasaki up until 1722.10 While the majority of these junks’ 
crews were Chinese, the vessels were identified as Thai in their being referred to 
as Senra-Sen (暹羅船).11 The contents of bilateral correspondence ranged from 
expressions of friendliness based on geographical proximity and a shared religion, 
to moral support in wartime and messages of condolence in times of sorrow.12




9 Ishii Yoneo, “Thai-Japanese relations in the pre-modern period: A bibliographic essay with 
special references to Japanese sources”, in Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective, ed. 
Chaiwat Khamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds (Bangkok: Innomedia Co., Ltd. Press, 1988), pp. 4-5.
10 Ibid., pp. 5-6; Khien Theeravit, “Japanese-Siamese Relations, 1606-1629”, in Thai-Japanese 
Relations in Historical Perspective, ed. Chaiwat Khamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds (Bangkok: 
Innomedia Co., Ltd. Press, 1988), p. 25.  
11 Ishii, “Thai-Japanese relations in the pre-modern period”, pp.5-6.
12 Khien Theeravit, “Japanese-Siamese Relations, 1606-1629”, pp.24-25.
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Requests from the Shogun for eaglewood and firearms, and requests for horses 
from the Siamese court also featured in letters between the two governments.13
            Besides interactions with Ayutthaya Japan had also had significant trading 
relations with other regional polities, beginning around the middle of the 16th
century as the result of severed ties with traditional trading partners China and 
Korea as well as increased mercantile activity in the region due to European 
exploration and expansion into Asia.14 Japanese ships traded at ports in Formosa, 
Indochina and the Malay islands, importing as well as exporting a variety of 
products.15 The Vietnamese port of Hoi An appeared to have been another major 
Japanese trading partner in the region from 1592 till the implementation of the
closed-door policy, as witnessed in the formation of a Japanese Street within the 
port city, though it appeared that the closed-door policy had a more disruptive 
effect in Hoi An as compared to Ayutthaya in the form of the decline of the 
Japanese settlement.16 The existence of such links was thus the historical basis on 
which Edo-era interest in studying the region had rested.
           The first wave of nanshin-ron emerged as the Edo period came to a close 
and the Meiji era began. Essentially, nanshin-ron were ideas and discussions 
concerning how Japan’s relationship with its neighbours in the South Seas should 
be conducted, but, as the name indicates, with an emphasis on Japan’s expansion 
                                                          
13 Ibid., pp.30-31. 
14 Iwao Seiichi, “Japanese Foreign Trade in the 16th and 17th Centuries”, Acta Asiatica, 30 (1976), 
pp.1-4. 
15 Ibid., p.10.
16 Vu Minh Giang, “The Japanese Presence in Hoi An”, in Ancient Town of Hoi An: International 
Symposium held in Danang on 22-23 March 1990 (Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 1993), pp. 135, 139-
140.
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southwards. These discussions that urged greater Japanese involvement in the 
South Seas were based on the common belief that the region was essential to 
Japan in several ways, particularly in the economic sphere.17 Three time periods 
in which such opinions were particularly influential have been identified, with the 
first period occurring around the middle of the Meiji period, approximately 
between 1885-1890, the second period around the late Meiji-early Taishō eras 
from 1895-1918, and the last period from 1930 to 1943, the early years of the 
Shōwa period.18 With the waxing and waning of interest in nanshin-ron over 
these three periods, shifts in focus and emphasis from one period to the next were 
also observable. It is arguable that each respective time period in which nanshin-
ron was popular was successive phases in its development, with it taking on new 
characteristics and expressions each time it re-emerged, in reflection of the 
historical circumstances, the zeitgeist that brought about its revival.  This chapter 
will discuss the first two periods, both in terms of the nature of nanshin-ron in 
these two periods and the forms in which these discussions and opinions were 
advanced and carried out, before going on to cover the origins and early 
development of the Nanyō Kyōkai, first as the product of nanshin-ron and then as 
a contributor with its research and knowledge producing activities.
                                                          
17 Shimizu Hajime, Southeast Asia in Modern Japanese Thought: Essays on Japanese-Southeast 
Asian Relationship 1880-1940 (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Prefectural University, 1997), p.1. The period 
1895-1910 is usually not described as one of these influential periods, with the second period 
marked as 1910-1918, despite acknowledgement that the Japanese government first became 
interested in southward advance during these years as the result of Japan’s victories in the Sino-
Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. I have chosen to include developments in nanshin-ron from 
1895-1910 as part of the second period due to its significance for and clear linkage with the 
development of nanshin-ron and, particularly, the formation and later development of the Nanyō 
Kyōkai. 
18 Ibid., pp.1, 46.
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Romantic visions and power politics: Nanshin-ron’s genealogy and its Mid-Meiji 
form
              While it is acknowledged among scholars that nanshin-ron first gained 
influence in the mid-Meiji period, there is also a degree of consensus that its 
theoretical origins can be traced to the Edo period.  Notably, it has been traced to 
the writings of two personalities, Honda Toshiaki and Satō Nobuhiro, both of 
whom advocated Japanese overseas expansion towards the end of the Tokugawa 
regime.19
                Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) was not particularly interested in Japanese 
southward expansion, but the South Seas region came into his writings calling for 
increased foreign trade, colonization and the development of interests in foreign 
lands in order to solve Japan’s problems caused by overpopulation.20 Concerned 
with Russian expansion in the north, he saw Japanese development of Hokkaido 
and Karafuto as matters of emergency, the undertaking of which would also 
resolve problems caused by population pressure.21 Believing that participating in 
overseas trade would equip Japan with knowledge in navigation, geography and
astronomy essential for developing the north, and seeing foreign trade as a key 
factor behind the strength of the European powers he urged for the resumption of 
foreign trade and ship building which would also allow for colonization and 
development of islands around Japan and contribute further to national 
                                                          
19 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
20 Ibid., p.5.
21 Grant K. Goodman, Japan, The Dutch Experience (London: The Athlone Press, 1986), p.218.
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prosperity.22 Such opinions shared similarities with the main thrust of the Meiji 
nanshin-ron.
                Satō Nobuhiro’s (1769-1850) writings, on the other hand, were part of a 
discourse on the application of the philosophy of the “benevolent Imperial Way” 
to the territories surrounding Japan. 23 His ideas were arguably a mixture of 
utopian romanticism with power politics, being in part the result of what he saw 
as the need for expansion to counter the imperialist advance by the Western 
nations, and in part the product of his study of the Chinese classics.24 These 
elements can be observed in his proposal for expansion into the Phillipines, 
Manchuria, Korea, China, Formosa and the Ryukyus, following which the 
implementation of benevolent government over this region would enable the 
combined Chinese and Japanese armies to overwhelm Europe and America.25
They are also illustrated in his writings on maritime trade and recommendations 
on policy towards Russia and Britain. His support of maritime trade was not 
couched in terms limited to the practical purpose of obtaining necessary products 
that domestic production was unable to provide, but also in terms of making the 
Japanese people heroic and daring through the dangers and trials experienced on 
the open seas.26  Regarding Russia and Britain, the two powers expanding to the 
north and south of Japan, he proposed the seizure of Kamchatka and the Sea of 
Okhotsk in the north; the seizure of the Bonins, Philippines and other islands such 
                                                          
22 Ibid., pp.218-219.
23 Yano Tōru, Nanshin no keifu南進の系譜 (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1975), pp.48-49.
24 Shimizu, Southeast Asia in Modern Japanese Thought, pp.5-6.
25 Goodman, Japan, The Dutch Experience, pp.220-221.
26 Ibid., p.220.
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as Java and Borneo in the south, to be followed by the construction of 
fortifications against the European powers to secure Japanese control of the Far 
East.27   Both strands of his thinking were also observed in the nanshin-ron that 
emerged towards the middle of the Meiji era. 
             This first wave of nanshin-ron that appeared around 1885, approximately 
two decades after the Meiji Restoration and the country’s re-opening, was the 
product of a number of factors, both domestic and international. As reflected by 
the main thrust of writings from this period advocating southward expansion, 
domestic factors can be summarized into the need to solve the problem of 
unemployment among descendants of the samurai class following the destruction 
of the former feudal system, and a shift in focus from promoting democratic rights 
to enhancing Japan’s power and prestige in the international arena, following the 
collapse of the movement for democratic rights.28 This coincided with the broader 
shift in mentality from being concerned with domestic colonization to overseas 
colonization, as evidenced by writers such as Taguchi Ukichi, author of Nanyō 
keiryaku ron (南洋経略論),  who moved from advocacy of developing Hokkaido 
to exhortation of southward advance.29 Known as Japan’s foremost advocate of 
English laissez faire doctrines, Taguchi in Nanyō keiryaku ron described the 
South Seas as an area not entirely under effective European control due to a lack 
of European settlers despite European claims, thus making the region suited for 
Japanese colonization in the form of migration, land purchases from native 
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29 Yano, Nanshin no keifu, p.66. 
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leaders and settlement.30 This would alleviate the problems of overpopulation in 
Japan, while also bringing about the expansion of Japan’s merchant marine, 
which would in turn necessitate desirable naval expansion. 31   The German 
takeover of the Marshall Islands in 1885 had the further effect of temporarily 
centering Japanese attention on the Nanyō and the struggle for territory and 
influence among the European powers in the Pacific.32 Although much of the 
Pacific had by then been claimed by the Britain, France and Spain, the German 
acquisition of the Marshalls highlighted the fact that the amount of unclaimed 
territory of any significance was rapidly shrinking in this region close to home 
that Japan had viewed as an appealing target for colonization.33  Thus not only 
was Japanese attention turned from the domestic to the international arena during 
this period, it was also focused upon the South Seas, a region outside Japan’s 
traditional concern with its neighbours on the East Asian mainland.34   It should 
be noted, however, that the Japanese government of this period was not 
particularly interested in a southward advance, although there were concerns with 
strengthening naval defenses.35 Such concerns derived from acknowledgement of 
Japan’s naval inadequacies especially in the face of naval expansion undertaken 
in the 1880s by not only European nations and America, but also China, which by 
1889 had assembled a Northern Fleet larger than the entire Japanese Navy and 
consisting of two German-constructed battleships that were larger, more 
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powerfully armed and heavily armored than anything the Japanese Navy had in its 
possession.36 Anxiety regarding Chinese naval expansion was further exacerbated 
by tensions resulting from Japan’s desire to expand its interest in Korea and 
China’s determination to limit Japanese influence.37 While there certainly were 
attempts by members of the navy to push for a Southward advance policy and 
connect it with Japan’s future security and prosperity as justification for naval 
expansion, such efforts undertaken with individuals and organizations that saw 
Japan’s future in Southward expansion had little impact on policies and budgets at 
the elite level of government.38  Advocates who put forth their opinions regarding 
the nature and necessity of nanshin were mainly politicians, journalists and 
writers found outside the halls of political power. And while understandings of 
nanshin-ron has been greatly influenced by its association with Japanese 
expansionism from the 1930s onwards, mid-Meiji nanshin was primarily 
interested in the peaceful expansion of economic activity, and this trait can be said 
to have been dominant in subsequent appearances of nanshin-ron until the 1930s.
               What characteristics then, can be seen in this first emergence of nanshin-
ron, originating within circles that possessed a certain degree of influence but 
outside the official sources of political power? Two strains of nanshin-ron can be 
observed, their differences closely connected to two different perceptions of 
Japan’s position and how it related to its neighbouring regions. Despite these 
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differences, however, certain common aspects exist in both strains to be referred 
to as characteristics of this period’s nanshin-ron. 
                 Mid-Meiji nanshin-ron of the first type discussed the South Seas from
the perspective of Japan’s relationship with its East Asian neighbours.39 Tarui 
Tōkichi’s Daitō gappō ron (大東合邦論), which advocated the creation of a new 
nation, Daitō koku (大東国 ) through the union of Japan and Korea is 
representative of this kind of view regarding Japan’s Southward advance. 40  
According to Tarui’s ideals, this new nation would then partner with China to 
emancipate and develop the colonies of the South Seas, uniting against the threat 
from the Russian Oriental Navy, thus removing a perceived obstacle to nanshin.41  
Tarui’s emphasis, however, was on present-day mainland Southeast Asia; he 
considered the islands of the South Seas to be savage land that could, nonetheless, 
partake of the benefits of civilization, emanating from the Qing court.42 His ideas 
were clearly influenced by Confucian cosmology of a civilized centre surrounded 
by savage lands and peoples, and also reflected Japan’s enduring concern with the 
situation on the Asian mainland.43
              The other stream of thought in Mid-Meiji nanshin-ron reflected a 
different self-perception of Japan’s geographical position and its relations with its 
neighbours. Arguably embodying a different consciousness of space and 
geography that defined Japan in terms of an island chain in the Pacific instead of 
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its connections to the Asian mainland, it was not as influential as the 
aforementioned line of thought during the mid-Meiji period but has come to be 
more widely perceived as what constituted nanshin-ron in later periods.44 Unlike 
the other line of argument that emphasized the mainland, this second stream of 
nanshin-ron argued for advance into the South Seas on the basis that Japan was 
essentially a trading state and a sea power, independent of China. 45  
Representative works that reflect this particular line of though include Shiga 
Shigetaka’s Nanyō jiji (南洋時事); Taguchi Ukichi’s Nanyō keiryaku ron (南洋
経略論) and Suganuma Tadakaze’s Shin nihon no tonan no yume (新日本の図南
の夢).46 Shiga’s Nanyō jiji, a bestseller that went through four editions in four 
years presented Japan’s modernization and economic development as vital for 
Japan’s future survival through his Darwinian accounts of native civilizations in 
the Pacific in severe decline after falling to European colonization. 47 His 
recommendations on Japan’s future course of action called for Japan to follow the 
British example and make itself a centre for maritime and regional trade, based on 
its geographic features as an island nation at Asia’s doorstep, while 
simultaneously pursuing overseas emigration.48 Suganuma’s work shared similar 
themes of encouraging trade and emigration, but was interesting in calling for, 
among other things, Japan to protect itself against Western encroachment either 
by aiding the efforts of neighbouring states such as Siam in resisting the Western 
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advance, or by aiding or seizing European colonies in the region such as Annam, 
Java and Sumatra.49 Perceiving Spain as a weak colonial power, he further called 
for Japan to seek out new territories within the Philippines, claiming it was the 
will of the gods to ultimately give them to Japan.50 According to this argument, 
Spanish control of the Philippines was merely a temporary measure to prevent 
them from being claimed by another power. 51 Beyond a common maritime 
orientation, these works reflect a range of fairly different world views, ideologies 
as well as perceptions of regional conditions.
           These works have also been deemed to be representative of Meiji-era
nanshin-ron by later scholars and as having made an impact in terms of the role
nanshin-ron had played in the history of modern Japan.52 For instance, in his 
assessment of the historical role of nanshin-ron, Yano Tōru mentions a number of 
these authors and their works as having exerted a degree of influence, 
theoretically, on nanshin-ron as national policy, as well as contributed to Japanese 
interest in the South Seas as a novel and distinct region, separate from the West 
(西洋, the West Sea) or the region (東洋, the East Seas) Japan understood itself to 
be a part of.53  He also credits these writings to have made a greater impact in 
terms of raising public awareness and interest in the region than the political 
novels that expressed similar ideas and were published during the same period.54
It is to a brief discussion of these political novels that this chapter moves on to, so 
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as to get a fuller picture of the media through which advocacy of nanshin-ron was 
carried out and the factors behind its emergence in this period. 
              Appearing in the aftermath of the breakdown of the movement of 
democratic rights, it is not entirely surprising that authors of political novels 
advocating southward advance had also been advocates of democratic rights, 
many of whom belonged to the Rikken Kaishin Tō (立憲改進党 The 
Constitutional Progressive Party, hereafter referred to as the Progressives).55 This 
is especially since it can be said that nanshin-ron of this period possessed a 
certain anti-government, anti- centre quality, which was not just limited to these 
political novels but were also found in the works mentioned earlier.56 Such novels 
were thus in a sense an outlet for the frustrations of liberal political reformers.57
Laying stress on an economic nanshin, examples of these titles would be Ukishiro 
monogatari (浮城物語) by Yano Ryūkei and Nanyō no daiharan (南洋の大波
乱) by Suehiro Tecchō.58 Both authors were known for their political novels 
calling for political reform and civil rights before they began writing about the 
South Seas, using the region mainly as a narrative device to discuss domestic 
politics.59 Notably, Yano had been a pioneer of the political novel format, a 
follower of Progressive party founder Ōkuma Shigenobu and keen organizer of 
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the Progressives. 60 More concerned with domestic reforms instead of 
international prestige, the Progressives’ views regarding foreign policy were 
dominated by international trade, which made the South Seas a natural area of 
interest for them, in contrast to involvement in China or Korea, both of which 
seemed fraught with the risk of disputes and conflicts.61 Such political novels set 
in the South Seas achieved sufficient popularity between the late 1880s and mid-
1890s as a separate sub-genre, but attention soon shifted away from the region 
following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.62
             With this brief summary of the advocates of southward advance and their 
writings in mind, what common characteristics can be said to exist in this period’s 
discussions of southward advance? 
              The first characteristic would be the belief that it was imperative for the 
Japanese to venture abroad, the South Seas’ potential importance was greater than 
any other region, such that involvement in the region would resolve Japan’s social 
and economic problems. 63 Combining with this belief of the necessity of 
expanding abroad, or perhaps better described as another face of its expression, 
was an emphasis on the lack of development and backwardness of the region and 
Japan’s mission to step in and correct this state of affairs.64 At the same time, little, 
if any acceptance of the region’s status as being mostly under the control of the 
Western powers could be discerned, while doubts were expressed regarding the 
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Western powers’ ability to develop the region and the rightness of Western 
involvement.65 Present within the equation was the understanding of the direct 
relation between national power and overseas expansion, a point made clear by 
the Western presence in Japan’s regional waters.66 Such was the mix of realist 
calculations and romantic beliefs that existed in this period’s advocacy of 
southward advance.
             Another common characteristic was the acknowledgement and 
lamentation that despite the region’s proximity to Japan, knowledge about it was 
scarce, incomparable to the vast number of sources on the West available in 
Japan.67 With their beliefs in the importance of the region to Japan’s future 
prospects confronted by this situation, advocates of nanshin naturally emphasized 
the importance of collecting, studying and accumulating information and 
knowledge on the region, while those who had travelled to the region and 
published their accounts, such as Shiga Shigetaka, a former schoolteacher whose 
travels through the region resulted in the publication of the aforementioned  
Nanyō jiji took pride in their contribution to the field.68
              The maritime orientation in mid-Meiji nanshin-ron is another 
characteristic running through the different opinions regarding nanshin. With 
nanshin being consciously advocated in opposition to northward, continental 
advance, as well as the nature of the region in which Japan’s southward advance 
was to take place, it was only natural for such a trait to be present. This was 
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observed in expressions of concern regarding the Japanese lack of interest in 
naval matters, coupled with recommendations to strengthen the Navy, enhance 
Japan’s shipbuilding capabilities, extend sea routes and promote trade.69 Such 
concerns were not unfounded, as evidence pointing to design flaws in Japan’s 
vessels, inexperienced crews and dependence on foreign merchant marines for the 
nation’s overseas trade had come to light.70 A propaganda campaign undertaken 
by spokesmen of the navy under the slogan Kaikoku Nippon, maritime Japan,
articulated the abovementioned concerns and proposed solutions.71  In line with 
the main thrust of this period’s nanshin-ron, much emphasis was placed on the 
expansion of the merchant marine, essential in the development of trade and 
communications with the islands of the South Seas, and in the promotion of 
economic activities and settlement in the region.72            
           Such were the characteristics of the works through which advocacy of 
nanshin took place in the mid-Meiji period. Emerging out of a specific set of 
historical conditions in the mid- 1880s, factors which partly accounted for its 
characteristics, interest in the South Seas quickly waned as tensions between 
Japan and China arose again over the Korean issue, thereby re-concentrating 
attention northwards of Japan.73   With this ground covered, the next time frame 
in which strong interest in the region was observed, which was also the period 
that saw the founding of the Nanyō Kyōkai will be discussed. 
                                                          
69 Yano, Nanshin no keifu, p.54.
70 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 19.
71 Ibid.
72 Shimizu, Southeast Asia in Modern Japanese Thought, pp.13-15.
73 Yano, Nanshin no keifu, p. 68. 
41
Directions of overseas expansion: the appearance of ‘official’ nanshin-ron
              The second emergence of nanshin-ron was first observed among 
Taiwan’s colonial administrators in the aftermath of Japan’s victory in the Sino-
Japanese war of 1894-1895 and the resulting acquisition of Taiwan. 74 Such 
circumstances and the background of its new advocates go a long way in 
explaining the notable differences between this ‘official’ form of nanshin-ron and 
its predecessor. 
               Making the argument that expansion of Japanese influence into South 
China as essential to the governing and development of Taiwan as well as Japan’s 
national prestige, this official version of nanshin-ron was first raised by Katsura 
Tarō, Taiwan’s second Governor-General in a written opinion piece in 1896.75 It 
was further developed by and translated into policy by  Kodama Gentarō and 
Gōtō Shinpei, the fourth Governor-General of Taiwan and Chief of Civil 
Administration in the Kodama administration respectively.76
               Although all three men used the terms “nanshin” and “nanshin policy” 
in their proposals, their ideas differed from mid-Meiji nanshin-ron in terms of the 
region emphasized and in the form of advance advocated, which entailed the 
acquisition of territory in south China by the Japanese government. These 
characteristics were further strengthened by the Russo-Japanese war and Japanese 
gains by the conflict’s conclusion, which increased Japan’s possessions and 
                                                          




commitments to mainland China, Korea and Manchuria.77 It was also in this 
period that southward advance; expressed in terms of Nanshin Hokushu (南進北
守 Advance in the South and Defence in the North) was taken up by Tokyo as an 
option in national defence strategy for the first time, most clearly seen in its 
discussion together with the opposite strategy of northward advance and 
southward defence in “Guidelines for Imperial National Defence”, which was 
approved by the Cabinet in February 1907.78 Both of these competing concepts 
were deeply rooted in inter-service rivalry between the army and navy, with the 
promotion of nanshin closely linked to the navy’s attempt since the 1870s to 
challenge the primacy of the army, carve out an independent rationale and obtain 
both popular and budgetary support for naval expansion. 79 Articulated as an 
alternative to the army’s continental, northward advance, nanshin in military 
terms was more an argument then solid strategy, yet it became a naval dogma 
directing naval thought regarding the size and purpose of its fleet.80 The ensuing 
decades had neither resolved the rivalry between the two services nor the question 
of the nation’s strategic priorities, of which the latter had taken on increased 
complexity by 1907 following Japanese territorial gains in Northeast Asia.81 As a 
compromise between opposing strategic approaches championed by the army and 
navy respectively, the “Guidelines for Imperial National Defence” did not resolve 
but perpetuated the divergence between the two arms of the nation’s military, 
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with the army planning for war against the hypothetical enemy of Russia and the 
navy, against the USA.82
           Despite the reasons behind this emergence of official interest in nanshin, it
remains significant in view of how it was later developed and implemented during 
the Pacific War, but circumstances at the turn of the century, particularly the need 
to rebuild Japan’s economy and military after two victorious but financially 
draining wars meant that the official version of nanshin-ron with its inherent 
territorial ambitions did not become dominant in related discussions.83 Peaceful 
economic advance remained the best option, and although great interest in the 
South Seas cannot be said to have existed in this period, attention continued to be 
devoted to the region in terms of books and journals advocating exactly economic 
engagement. Titles include Takekoshi Yosaburō’s Nangoku ki (南国記), based 
upon his travels in the region that achieved ten print runs within two years; two 
survey reports by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce regarding Japan’s 
trade with the region and the industries and resources of the region respectively, 
as well as South Seas-related articles in journals such as Shokumin Zasshi (殖民
雑誌) and Jitsugyō no Nihon (実業の日本).84 Southward advance was described 
as the fulfillment of Japanese destiny by economic historian Takekoshi, who 
perceived economic needs and activities as the key to understanding historical 
development and Japan’s successes in Taiwan as proof of Japan’s possession of 
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the gift of “colonizing ability”.85  These publications maintained a certain level of 
interest in and discussion of the nanyō, but interest did not exist on the level that 
could secure funding for an organization such as the Nanyō Kondankai. 
Nonetheless, they kept interest in the region alive, with the journal Jitsugyō no 
nihon, which did not only publish articles on the South Seas but had devoted two 
entire issues to it credited with spreading awareness on the region within the 
Japanese public above any other publication of this period.86  Interest in the region 
was only re-ignited with the outbreak of WWI and its economic impact, factors 
which formed the background for the founding of the Nanyō Kyōkai. 
Founding and early history
           The Nanyō Kyōkai’s founding in 1915 has been attributed to the efforts of 
two men, Inoue Masaji, an executive at the Nan-A Kungssu Co., a trading 
company, and Uchida Kakichi, who was then the director of the Civil Affairs 
Department of the Taiwan Government General.87 Against the background of 
rising public interest in the South Seas stemming from Japanese occupation of the 
Pacific islands formerly held by Germany and the dramatic rise in exports to the 
region as Japan filled the economic vacuum created by European focus on the war, 
Inoue and Uchida, with the support of the Government General of Taiwan, were 
able to garner sufficient backing in political and business circles for the 
                                                          
85 Takekoshi Yosaburō, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan (London: 
Routledge 2004), pp. ix, x; Takekoshi Yosaburō, Japanese Rule in Formosa (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1907), pp.2, 11.
86 Yano, pp.73-75.
87 Akashi, “Nanyō Kyōkai 1915-1945”, p.1.
45
organization’s revival. 88   Concrete financial support for the Association’s 
activities was also obtained from the Taiwan Government General, and the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture and Commerce.89  The association’s 
official history mentions studying the Tōyō Kyōkai to learn from its experience, 
but the better organized effort in contrast to the earlier founding of the Nanyō 
Kondankai, especially with regards to securing financial backing, demonstrates 
that the Nanyō Kyōkai’s founders  had not just learnt from others but from its 
own history too.  Besides greater interest in the region by 1915 that provided the 
momentum not just for the establishment but also the expansion of the 
organization swiftly after its founding, financial support from official sources was 
probably a key factor accounting for the longevity of the organization. The 
repercussions from such close association with the government would only 
become apparent in later years, to be discussed in another chapter.
            An organization’s purpose determines to a great extent its character, 
structure and activities; this was true for the Nanyō Kyōkai. Declaring itself as 
having been created to fill a gap of knowledge regarding the region so as to 
encourage economic interaction, mutual economic advancement, understanding, 
friendship and of course, the sustained growth of national power, the reflection of 
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these aims in the aforementioned aspects of the Nanyō Kyōkai  will be discussed 
in the rest of this chapter.90
            Describing the South Seas as a 
“…vast area of one million miles…rich with inexhaustible 
resources waiting for development by people of the world… 
The association plans to study affairs of Nanyō for its 
development…to promote the welfare of the peoples of 
Japan and Nanyō, desiring to make contributions to world 
civilization. The knowledge and notion of our people are 
poorer than those of Europeans and Americans who live far 
away from the region…It is regretted that our relationship 
with Nanyō has been left entirely to the hands of individual 
entrepreneurs, neglecting academic, social and economic 
exchanges. With the founding of the Association, this defect 
can be corrected”,91
the Nanyō Kyōkai’s mission statement spelled out clearly its perception of the 
region and its self-prescribed role within this context. Proposed activities to fulfill 
this role were as follows:
1. Study the industrial, constitutional, social and other 
relevant aspects of the region
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2. Disseminate information of the region in Japan
3. Disseminate information about Japan in the region
4. Develop talent necessary for Japan’s South Seas
endeavours 
5. Spread Japanese medicine, technology and other knowledge
6. Publish journals and other materials
7. Conduct lectures
8. Establish museums and libraries92
            Clearly, a key focus of the association’s activities as laid out by the above 
statements would be in the realm of research, publication and education. The 
organs established within the first ten years of its history were reflective of this 
focus, with a monthly journal, research and editorial department, overseas 
branches and commercial museums swiftly established after its founding, with a 
number of these organs created with the aim of raising the quality of research.93   
        The bureaucracy of the organization, the other aspect of its structure was 
conventional, consisting of a president, two vice-presidents, a head of accounts, 
an executive director, a manager and boards of councilors and directors. 94  
However, one characteristic of the association’s leadership that was present right 
from the beginning was its rather elitist nature. Eighteen prominent personalities 
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from political, business and government realms had endorsed its founding, and its 
leadership continued to consist of the elite in these fields throughout its history.95  
Its first president, Viscount Yoshikawa Akimasa, was the head of the Privy 
Council; its vice-presidents Uchida and Baron Yoshikawa Jūkichi, and its first 
executive director was Rear Admiral Shōji Yoshimoto.96 This can be understood 
to have been in part due to the personalities involved in the project from the 
beginning and their backgrounds, and in part due to the needs of the organization. 
In seeking to gather and disseminate information about a foreign region, 
encourage investment as well as support and mediate Japanese economic 
endeavours in the Nanyō, funding as well as aid from those with political clout 
and connections were indispensible. The fact that  these personalities were not 
only in a position to support the organization’s activities but also act upon its 
recommendations only made their involvement of greater importance, especially 
with regards to lobbying efforts to counter legislation in the Nanyō unfavorable to 
Japanese economic activities.  
             Research and publication activities, deemed to have formed the main 
projects of the Nanyō Kyōkai, were swiftly began after its founding, with the first 
issue of its in house magazine, Nanyō Kyōkai Kaihō (南洋協会々報) released in 
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January 1915, the same month of its founding. 97 This was arguably the key 
avenue through which the association disseminated information it had collected.  
Usually issued at the end of each month, a typical issue would reiterate the 
association’s mission and rules, followed by a number of articles regarding 
various aspects of the Nanyō, a short report on association activities such as the 
opening of a new branch or details of upcoming lectures, followed by a list of 
members. The first issues were fairly thin volumes of around 50 pages each, 
consisting of four to five articles besides the pages on association matters, but it 
swiftly grew in content and range of topics. As the journal expanded in content, it 
also became more organized, perhaps out of necessity, with its articles grouped 
under various sub-headings beginning from mid-1916 onwards instead of simply 
listed in order on the contents page. Besides the longer articles on various topics, 
the journal also provided from time to time information that was unlikely to be 
easily or quickly available within Japan, for instance, exchange rates of major 
currencies circulating in the Nanyō, the cost of travelling by sea to various ports 
in the Dutch East Indies, or detailed translations of upcoming changes in postal 
charges in the Dutch East Indies.98  The overseas branches, five of which were 
founded in the first decade, conducted much of its own research regarding their 
separate territories and provided the journal with many of its articles.99
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          In line with the aims of the association, the journal’s articles mainly 
discussed economic-related matters, covering a wide spectrum of topics dealing 
with various aspects of the territories in the South Seas. A sampling of such topics 
include “Agriculture in the Federated Malay States (Marai renpōshū no nōgyō 馬
来連邦州の農業)”, “The millinery industry in Java (Jawa no seibō gyō爪哇の制
帽業)”, “Strategies to maintain and expand trade with China and the Nanyō 
(Shina kyū nanyō bōeki ijihatten saku支那及南洋貿易発展策)”, “The future of 
trade with the South Seas (Tai nan bōeki no shōrai 対南貿易の将来)”, and “The 
leather industry in Siam (Shamu no hikakugyō暹羅の皮革業)”. There were also 
articles providing an overview of a territory’s annual trade, inclusive of statistics, 
such as “Trade in the Malay Peninsula in 1918 (1918 nendo ni okeru marai hantō 
no bōeki 千九百十八年度に於ける馬来半島の貿易)”, which had been based 
upon the Times’ Trade Supplement.100 Although the focus was undeniably on 
economic matters, culture-related articles were not entirely lacking, though they 
constituted only a small fraction of the journal’s contents. From time to time there 
would be articles such as “The structure of Siam’s Cabinet (Shamu no naikaku 
kansei 暹羅の内閣官製)”, “Culture and peoples of the South Seas (Nanyō no 
fūzoku kyū ninjō 南洋の風俗及人情)”, or “Regarding the South Seas’ art and 
handicrafts (Nanyō no bijutsu kōgei nitsuite 南洋の美術工藝に就いて)”. The 
last article is particularly interesting in its fairly in-depth discussion of not only 
the different types of handicrafts produced by the Malays but also the interplay of 
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Malay and foreign influences and the division into two main schools, each arising 
from the east and west coasts of the Sunda Straits respectively.101  Moreover, just 
as there were serialized installments of certain economic topics, serialized 
installments of cultural topics such as a five-part series on the tribes of French 
Indochina, published over the first half of 1921, as well as multi-part series on the 
myths and legends of the natives of Borneo and Australia, and even a biography 
of Rajah Brooke of Sarawak.  However, perhaps reflecting of the slant towards 
economic matters, most of these were in the appendix section at the end of each 
issue.102
        Besides economic matters, in the first couple of years articles providing a 
general idea of various places contributed by those who had resided in or travelled 
to the region were common. An example would be an article on the Philippines 
and Cambodia by a Railways Board official, Tsurumi Yūsuke, who had travelled 
through the region on an official research trip.103  Tsurumi’s article was typical of 
its genre, touching on history, geographical features, population size and 
distribution, ethnic and religious divisions, sanitation standards and economic 
activity with regards to the Philippines. His observation that difficulties were 
likely to arise for Japanese men who marry local women due to the higher status 
of women in comparison to Japan, and his argument that laziness among the 
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locals, besides conflicts and pests was a main reason for needing to import large 
quantities of rice despite bountiful lands and resources were the more interesting 
points.104 The shorter portion on Cambodia touched briefly on its history, together 
with descriptions of the capital and Angkor Wat. 
          Such articles gave way gradually to more specific and in-depth discussions 
of particular topics, and reports of recent developments in the region. For example, 
Itakura Kakurō’s “Recent happenings in the Philippines (Hirippin no kinkyō比律
賓の近況)”, which was published in January 1920 had reported on the state of the 
Filipino independence movement, increasingly apparent anti-Japanese sentiments, 
and rumours of shifting the capital.105  Such articles complemented the function of 
reporting on recent events the magazine had been serving since mid-1916 with the 
addition of an current affairs section that became a mainstay of each issue, 
reporting on varied matters such as the population of Taiwan as reflected by the 
latest census, changes in prices of sugar and rubber, the cost of labour, the 
demand for cement and restrictions on land ownership or import quotas in the 
format of short reports.106 The stationing of part-time reporters in various cities 
throughout the region beginning in May 1917 to improve the quality of research 
also added to the sense of first-hand reporting from the region. By 1922 reporters 
had been stationed in Singapore, Surabaya, Manila, Sumatra, Bangkok, 
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Halmahera, Batavia, Rangoon and Haiphong, with their contributions indicated 
with the place they were reporting from.107
          Most impressive among the journal’s contents were probably the 
installments that provided comprehensive and extensive information on various 
topics, often with large numbers of statistics. Topics ranged from the general, 
such as “About British North Borneo (Eiryō kita boruneo jijō 英領北ボルネオ事
情)”, to the very specific, such as “The planting and production of cocoa (Kakao 
no saibai to seizōカカオの栽培及製造) and “Pepper from the Netherlands East 
Indies (Ranryō tō indo no koshō 蘭領東印度の胡椒)”. Reflecting Japanese 
concern with the overseas Chinese, there was also a five-part series titled 
“Research on the overseas Chinese (Kakyō no kenkyū 華僑の研究)”published in 
1922, with some focus on Chinese economic organization and anti-Japanese 
sentiments. 
            Another change that had taken place in the journal’s structure was its 
renaming as the Nanyō Kyōkai Zasshi (南洋協会雑誌) from 1919 onwards, with 
the addition of an editor’s note that gave an inkling of issues it was concerned 
with, for example the collapse of rubber prices and Japanese immigration to the 
region.108 As far as can be ascertained, by this time it had taken on the structure 
that will endure till the dissolution of the association.
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           Besides the journal, the headquarters of the Nanyō Kyōkai and the Taiwan 
branch also published monographs from time to time. These included 
compilations of works previously serialized in the journal, collections of lectures, 
general works on the region and discussions of a particular country’s agriculture, 
a certain industry, or religion.109 One example was Nanyō no Kaikyō (南洋の回
教) by Segawa Kame, author of the previously mentioned article “Nanyō no 
bijutsu kōgei nitsuite”. This monograph, published in 1922, was an expanded 
collection of a lecture series on Islam in the South Seas he had delivered the 
previous year which provided a detailed overview on the roots of the religion, its 
spread to the South Seas, adaptations made by the region’s inhabitants and 
differing colonial policies towards the religion in various territories. 110 The 
existence of such titles not withstanding, in general the range of topics covered by 
the monographs resembled discussions in the journal in subject matter as well as 
the greater attention devoted to economic related matters. Dutch-Japanese 
dictionaries and translations of laws which were not published in the journal were 
the exception, but these dictionaries and translations of trademark or land owning 
laws were obviously published with the economic purpose of aiding Japanese 
businesses in the region in mind.111 One example of such publications was the 
translation of labour laws in the Federated Malay States, published in 1924, which 
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had originally been commissioned by the Nan-A Kungssu in which Inoue Masaji 
was an executive.112
            Overseas commercial museums set up in Singapore and Surabaya in 1918 
and 1924 respectively further complemented the association’s research activities. 
As further evidence of the association’s semi-governmental nature, the Singapore 
museum was started at the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 
which also provided five-eighths of its operating budget.113   Stating right from 
the start that its activities would not be limited to the exhibition of Japanese or 
foreign products, but would also answer requests to investigate and report on 
economic matters and furnish reports, statistics and books, the museums collected 
and disseminated information about the region as well as the territory they were 
situated in.114  The Singapore Commercial Museum also published its own journal, 
the Nanyō keizai jihō (南洋経済時報) from 1919 until it was absorbed into the 
Nanyō kyōkai Zasshi, with articles of a similar nature as the association’s journal 
but focusing more on aspects pertaining to Singapore, providing for instance a 
calendar of the festivals observed by the Indian, Chinese and Malay populations 
of Singapore in one particular issue.115
            The Nanyō Kyōkai was also involved in projects to encourage Japanese 
emigration to North Borneo during and after WWI. 116   Following feasibility 
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studies in the form of land surveys undertaken together with personnel from the 
Tōyō Immigration Company, the Japanese Legation in Bangkok, the Taiwan 
colonial government and the Japanese Consulate in Singapore, the association 
prepared reports, advocated and lobbied for emigration through its journal and 
appeals to government leaders and businessmen.117  This was an example not only 
of research activities taken in conjunction with segments of the government, but 
also of the application of knowledge produced.
            Having discussed the association’s research organs and the type of 
information collected and disseminated, the question of readership comes to the 
fore. Although in the first decade evidence of the kind of research that would be 
construed as espionage by the Western colonial authorities was not detectable, 
demand for information about numerous other topics concerning the Nanyō was 
clearly present. From 1921 to 1926 there were 97 instances in which the 
association provided information deemed unsuitable for publication in other 
media of the association or required urgently to other parties, with topics ranging 
from the tin mines of Malaysia to the collapse of rubber prices and the boycott of 
Japanese goods.118  While the association’s official history did not indicate the 
recipients of these reports, Akashi states that research was often commissioned by 
business organizations or by government agencies, while at other times 
information obtained was provided to the same groups as classified information 
with restricted circulation. 119   Seen together with governmental interest in 
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establishing a commercial museum in Singapore, as well as the support and 
funding granted to the association right from the start, it is apparent that during 
this period information and knowledge about the South Seas were lacking in 
Japan but in demand by many in political and business circles, who understood 
the value of information collected from within the region.
           Education, closely related to research, was another area of activity relevant 
to the association’s aims, and in the first ten years it was carried out in the form of 
language courses, public lectures and the short-lived commercial apprenticeship 
programme. Understanding the need for knowledge of the local languages, Dutch 
and Malay language classes were started at its Tokyo headquarters in 1917 and 
1921 respectively with teachers engaged from the Tokyo School of Foreign 
Languages (東京外国語学校).120  By 1925 eight cohorts ranging from three to 
sixteen students had completed the Dutch language classes, while one cohort had 
completed the Malay language course.121
          Aiming to inform society in general as well as members about various 
matters regarding the Nanyō, public lectures were launched in February 1915 and 
continued to be held at irregular intervals for a total of seventy-four times by the 
end of 1925. 122   The numbers of speakers and topics presented varied from 
session to session, ranging from one to four or five, with topics similar to those 
covered in journal articles, or sometimes by the very authors of these articles.123  
                                                          





One example would be Tsurumi Yūsuke, the Railways Board official, whose 1916 
article on the Philippines and Cambodia was discussed earlier, presenting a lecture with 
the same title in June 1916.124 While some of the speakers were leaders of the 
association such as Uchida Kakichi and Inoue Masaji, other speakers included 
academics from Japan’s universities, businessmen, company employees, 
government officials as well as former or current consular staff.125  Whether they 
were association members or not was unclear, but many of them appeared to have 
travelled to or been posted to the region, with some presenting their first-hand 
observations of the places they had visited or of the region in general.126
           Significant among the association’s education projects was the short-lived 
commercial apprenticeship programme, conducted from 1918 to 1920 in 
Singapore.127  Initiated once more at the request of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce, the one-year programme sought to enable young men to conduct 
business in the region by educating them in local languages, economic, business, 
hygienic and general knowledge, with three full-time teachers supplemented by 
part-time staff drawn from government officials and businessmen in Singapore.128  
Due to post-war economic difficulties in the form of finding employment for 
graduates of the course, the programme only graduated two cohorts before it was 
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halted, although it would be re-started in 1929 in response to new 
circumstances.129
            Passing mention of the association’s lobbying efforts was made earlier in 
discussing the social positions of its leadership. This constituted the other aspect 
of the association’s activities besides research and education, and it is in this area 
that its connections within government proved very useful. One early success of 
lobbying was in 1917, when the British seized and ended all telegraph services in 
the Dutch East Indies in June, tremendously inconveniencing Japanese businesses 
as trade and shipping could not be conducted.130  Utilizing their connections, 
association president Yoshikawa and vice-president Kakichi met with the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Commerce, and Communications 
about the issue, resulting in petitions by these ministers to the British and the 
successful re-opening of the telegraph lines between the region and Japan in 
November.131 The Communications Minister at the time also happened to be 
Nanyō Kyōkai’s director Den Kenjirō, thus providing an illustration of the ties 
between the association and the government, and how the association utilized 
such connections for their agendas, though undoubtedly this was possible because 
its aims did not in any way run contrary to government policies. 
           Another instance of successful lobbying concerned relaxing the criteria for 
Japanese doctors to set up practice in the Dutch East Indies. 132  Seeing the need 
for Japanese speaking doctors among the expanding Japanese community and 
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perceiving the lack of these doctors as a barrier to the growth of Japanese 
businesses, the Nanyō Kyōkai requested the government to initiate negotiations 
with the Dutch on this issue in 1923, and also petitioned the Foreign Minister and 
the Netherlands Legation. 133 Their efforts resulted in a compromise, with the 
Dutch allowing the opening of clinics by Japanese who received training at a 
Dutch medical school.134
            Yet not all lobbying efforts resulted in success, unsurprising since success 
depended on the willingness of European colonial governments to change their 
policies. Since the Nanyō Kyōkai’s lobbying efforts were meant to make it easier 
for Japanese to live and trade in European colonies, where their presence was not 
always welcome, lest to say competition, it was only natural for colonial 
governments to be unwilling to budge in certain cases.  Examples included 
attempts to get the British to rescind a law that threatened the prospects of 
Japanese-owned rubber plantations in Malaya as it limited the amount of land 
owned by foreigners to a maximum of 50 acres; representations to the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Commerce on behalf 
of trading companies dealing with French Indochina who felt discriminated 
against due to the lack of a trade treaty; and proposals to its own government as 
well as appeals to the Dutch colonial authorities to alter or rescind the Crisis 
Import Ordinance enacted by the Dutch Indies government that set up quotas on 
Japanese imports.135 While the Association was able to tap into its connections 
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with government personalities in these cases, they were unsuccessful in getting 
the colonial authorities to accommodate their requests. 
Advocacy altered: The Nanyō Kyōkai and nanshin-ron by 1925
         Historical works on nanshin-ron of the Taishō era unfailingly mention the 
Nanyō Kyōkai as an important proponent, if not the most significant advocate of 
nanshin during this period. Characteristics of different strains of nanshin-ron
were discernible in the association’s activities, such as the emphasis on economic 
interaction and the production and dissemination of knowledge, often through 
firsthand experience of the region. Significantly, the anti-government trait present 
in mid-Meiji discussions had disappeared, with the association working closely 
with the government, sometimes beginning new projects at the behest of and with 
financing from government bodies, at other times attempting to persuade the 
government into taking action. Nanshin, though at this stage couched in the terms 
of the private advocates instead of the militaristic phrasing of governmental 
interest from a slightly earlier period, was no longer primarily carried out through 
the writings of individuals representing no one besides themselves. Other media 
that had clamoured for southward advance, such as Jitsugyō no nihon had largely 
fallen silent on the issue with the end of the “Nanyō boom” shortly after WWI, 
leaving the Nanyō Kyōkai as the key voice regarding the region. 136   This 
combination of government and private interest in the Nanyō in the form of the 
Nanyō Kyōkai would continue to dominate discussion and advocacy of nanshin in 
the next decade.  
                                                          
136 Yano, Nanshin no keifu, p.75.
62
Chapter Three:
Continuity, Change and Comparisons: the second decade of the Nanyō 
Kyōkai
        The period from 1919 to 1934 has been described as one in which interest in 
the Nanyō was largely absent, with the Nanyō Kyōkai’s research activities 
deemed to have provided a means through which the idea of nanshin was 
preserved till it was re-ignited by developments in the mid-1930s.1  The account 
presented in the previous chapter of the association’s activities demonstrate that 
despite the drop in interest in the region post-WWI, sufficient interest and demand 
for information in certain quarters still existed to keep the association occupied 
and sufficiently financed  to not only continue researching and publishing but also 
plant new branches and  station reporters overseas. Given the nature of the 
association as an organization dependent on official sources of funding instead of 
donations from the wider public, it is not surprising that it was largely unaffected, 
so long as its funding sources continued to perceive value in and support its 
activities.2
           Continuity characterized the second decade of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s history 
to a significantly greater extent than change, with the association continuing with 
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its research, education and lobbying efforts began in the first ten years of its 
existence. Though the tremendous interest in the South Seas present at its 
founding had long dissipated without discernible signs of revival for much of this 
period, it was neither a new development nor did it cause significant distress for 
the organization for the abovementioned reasons. Change occurred in subtle and 
nuanced ways, with certain aspects of the association’s activities gradually 
acquiring a different tone until interest in nanshin, this time of a militaristic nature 
emerged in the mid-1930s, following which the Nanyō Kyōkai’s activities took on 
a new significance and set the stage for the major changes in the last decade of its 
history, which will be covered in the next chapter. 
           This chapter will thus discuss the continuities and changes in the 
organization’s activities from 1926 to 1936, paying attention to linkages with 
government networks and policies. As the focus of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s activities 
in the early Shōwa era remained its research and publication activities that sought 
to inform and encourage interest in the South Seas, they will be the first aspect of 
the association’s activities to be covered. Following which its education activities, 
namely its public lectures, language classes and most importantly the revival of 
the commercial apprenticeship programme will be examined, before moving on to 
its lobbying and propaganda activities, the latter of which was arguably a new 
realm the association moved into beginning from 1931. Where certain activities 
began in this decade and continued into the next are better assessed in totality 
instead of being truncated, their discussion in this chapter will include post-1935 
developments. 
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           Having examined different manifestations of Japanese interest in the South 
Seas prior to the appearance of the Nanyō Kyōkai in the earlier chapter so as to 
see the association in its proper historical context, this chapter will continue to do 
so through studying it in relation to similar Japanese organizations such as the 
Tōyō Kyōkai, the Tōa Dōbunkai, and the Research Department of the South 
Manchurian Railway Company (thereafter referred to as the SMR or Mantetsu). 
Reference will also be made to knowledge production efforts undertaken by 
colonial state actors where necessary to obtain a better picture of how the Nanyō 
Kyōkai’s activities fit into this realm of activity.
Researching and engaging the Nanyō in the early Shōwa era: different degrees of 
change amidst continuities
           The second decade of the Nanyō Kyōkai can arguably be seen as a 
transitional period between the first decade in which it was founded and begun the 
research activities that it became most known for, and the last period of its 
existence in which dramatic changes took place in the nature and activities of the 
association. Although little appeared to have changed for much of this period, 
another side of the significance of its connections with the government beyond 
their usefulness for the association began to materialize, although the full 
ramifications would only be witnessed after 1937. 
           Research and publication activities remained a key focus for the 
association in the early Shōwa period, perhaps even to the extent of being the 
main activity of the association in the absence of significant training programmes 
65
to develop talent for Japanese economic expansion after the halting of the short 
lived commercial apprenticeship scheme in 1920.3 The range and scope of topics 
covered remained largely similar to those of the prior decade, though with greater 
emphasis on certain issues in response to wider circumstances. 
             This was a period which saw an overall increase in Japanese economic 
involvement with the region, though there were periodic disruptions in the form 
of anti-Japanese economic agitation organized by the overseas Chinese in 
response to Japan’s policy towards China, notably in 1928 and 1931 following the 
Jinan and Manchurian incidents respectively. In general, having first made 
inroads into the regional markets during the extraordinary circumstances of WWI 
during which imports from the European colonial powers decreased greatly, the 
Japanese were able to hold onto their gains in the 1920s despite periodic 
fluctuations, increasing both the volume and range of products which were 
finding markets in the Nanyō.4 The competitiveness of Japanese goods, initially 
founded upon lower prices than their European competitors, also increased with 
improvements in quality as Japanese manufacturers began to acquire the skills 
and techniques that had given European producers their qualitative edge in the 
past.5   Following the onset of the Great Depression which did not leave the 
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regional economies unscathed, the dramatic devaluation of the Japanese yen in a 
situation in which price was a major consideration in the minds of consumers led 
to further gains in market share of Japanese goods, to the concern and alarm of the 
colonial authorities in the region, who reacted to the situation in different ways 
with other considerations in mind that were not purely economic.6 Perceiving a 
link between Japanese economic expansion and sinister aims to undermine their 
authority beginning with the weakening of the economic bonds between the 
metropolis and the colonies, the Dutch and British, determined to protect their 
positions in the South Seas took measures to remedy the situation. 7 The 
imposition of import regulations in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) from 1934, 
which had by then become a major market for Japanese goods, would be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, for it had led to intense concern 
among businesses with a stake in the region and the Nanyō Kyōkai. A reluctant 
colonial master to begin with, holding a far less significant economic stake in its 
colony of the Philippines and keen to avoid further friction in already difficult 
relations with Japan,  measures implemented by the USA in the Philippines which 
did not seem to have much impact and were easily circumvented were driven 
more by pressure from domestic business interests or the desire of prominent 
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Filipinos to enrich themselves through fronting “dummy” companies for Japanese 
businesses.8   
           Besides grabbing a greater share of the import trade to the region over this 
period, Japanese economic expansion in the region were also seen in  the realms 
of fishing, mining and shipping, the latter two of which were linked to the 
enterprises of one man, Ishihara Hiroichirō. Having begun mining in Malaya in 
1920; by 1926 Ishihara’s mines had displaced China as Japan’s main source of 
iron imports, while also succeeding in dominating the Malayan mining industry.9
Beginning with the purchase of two vessels in 1924 to ship iron ore from Malaya 
in Japan, Ishihara expanded into shipping on the Java-Japan line in 1931 with 20 
percent lower rates than his competitors that resulted in lowering the cost of 
Japanese exports to the NEI but also ignited a price war on the route that led to 
efforts of regulate the situation on the part of the Dutch authorities.10   With 
regards to fishing, Japanese entry into the Philippine fishing trade with skill, 
energy and capital resulted in Japanese domination of the industry by 1930, to the 
extent of supplying an estimated 80 percent of the fish products in Manila’s 
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markets.11 The government attempted to curb Japanese dominance through The 
Fisheries Act of 1932 which required foreigners in the fishing industry to be part 
of corporations in which a minimum of 61 percent of capital stock was in the 
hands of Filipino or American citizens, but this was to prove unsuccessful largely 
due to the aforementioned dummy system, with Japanese domination continuing 
till the outbreak of war.12  
         The period from 1926 to 1936 thus saw significant Japanese success in 
gaining a foothold or even attaining domination in certain aspects of the economic 
life of the South Seas, despite a general lack of interest in the region. Almost 
ironically perhaps, nanshin in the form of economic expansion achieved 
significant success precisely during this period in which general interest in the 
region within Japan was deemed lacking. Yet it must be remembered that despite 
Japanese success and prominence in certain industries, Japanese economic 
activities in the region constituted only a small part of overall Japanese economic 
relations on a global scale, with the trade volume between Japan and the South 
Seas significantly less than that between Japan and China, Japan and the USA, 
and Japan and the rest of Asia, even at the height of Japanese imports to the 
region between 1932 and 1936.13 Nevertheless it may be necessary to ponder 
upon the connections between Japan’s economic successes in the Nanyō, the 
restrictions the Western colonial authorities sought to place on Japan’s economic 
activities, the frustrations these may have engendered even if they were not 
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entirely successful in curbing Japan’s economic advance and the coalescence of a 
more aggressive policy of southward advance towards the region beginning after 
1935. Mark R. Peattie has noted that a renewed and more aggressive nanshin and 
Pan-Asian rhetoric emerged in Japan around the time when trade restrictions 
imposed by the Western colonial authorities began to bite, an occurrence that 
cannot be simply dismissed as coincidence. 14 For much of the period under 
examination in this chapter however Japanese thinking on the region remained 
focused on economic matters.
            This was reflected in both the contents of the association journal and the 
topics of research reports provided to external organizations. Established in the 
main trading centres of the region and looking out for developments that might 
impede Japanese economic expansion, the Nanyō Kyōkai continued to report on 
primarily economic concerns. Little change could be observed regarding the 
contents and general tone of the journal, which continued to publish mainly 
articles on economic matters, consisting of the usual mix of trade statistics, 
information regarding market conditions, often long and detailed studies on a 
certain industry or the agricultural and mineral resources in the region as well as 
information directly related to the conduct of business such as the introduction of 
new taxes within French Indochina in 1927.15 Updates on recent developments 
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within a certain territory, occasional travelogues and write-ups on important 
native political figures, together with articles of a more cultural nature on topics 
such as rituals of the natives of the South Seas and the White elephant of Siam 
rounded out the contents of a typical issue.16 While attention to significant issues 
such as Japanese military actions in China or Manchuria was not lacking, articles 
touching on these topics tended to focus on their economic significance for 
Japan’s southward advance, such as possible effects of Manchuria’s 
industrialization on the Nanyō or anti-Japanese boycotts organized by the 
overseas Chinese arising out of such events, without discussion of the events 
themselves.17 The prevailing tone and focus of the journal over this period was 
similar to that of the prior decade, centred on the promotion of trade and 
immigration. 
            To a greater extent than journal articles, research reports prepared by the 
association for external organizations can be expected to reflect the issues and 
developments that parties within Japan interested in the region were most 
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4, 17(April 1931).
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concerned with.  Topics of these reports do not betray this expectation, dominated 
by events and developments during this period that were most likely to hinder 
Japanese hopes for economic advance, namely anti-Japanese boycotts in various 
cities, the raising of import taxes in both British Malaya and NEI, and for much of 
the two years between 1933 and 1935, newly enacted import restrictions in the 
NEI.18  Import restrictions of any kind would have been cause for concern for the 
association and business interests in Japan, especially when they concerned a 
market that had been growing for the past few years, as was the case of the NEI. 
The imposition of such measures beginning in 1934, which can be perceived as 
either regulatory or protectionist depending on one’s perspective was mainly
caused by the startling increase in Japanese exports to the NEI between 1929 and 
1935, although there were other considerations related to long term economic 
planning, including the development of local industries that were contributory 
factors. 19   While the Netherlands and Britain had formerly been the primary 
trading partners of the NEI, constituting approximately 50 percent of its imports,
aided by the devaluation of the Japanese yen in December 1931, Japanese goods 
had eaten into their market share from 1929 onwards, tripling its market share 
from slightly more than 10 percent in 1929 to over 31 percent in 1935. 20  The 
accompanying decline in the volume of NEI exports to Japan as Taiwanese sugar 
came to substitute NEI sugar in the Japanese market led to a serious trade 
imbalance, which by itself may not have raised Dutch concerns but when seen in 
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conjunction with the insularity of overseas Japanese communities and the 
perception that Japanese economic expansion was part of a long term political 
strategy to undermine colonial authority, could only have triggered alarm within 
the Dutch government.21 Although Japan would not be the only trading partner 
affected by the new regulations, business interests and the Nanyō Kyōkai were 
naturally upset by the implementation of such measures at the moment when their 
efforts to develop markets for Japanese products in the South Seas were finally 
bearing fruit, thus explaining the concern and attention devoted to the issue in the 
mid-1930s. 
           A more interesting case of the association’s research activities undertaken 
during this period would be a study undertaken under orders from the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs from August 1930 onwards regarding the feasibility of large 
scale emigration to Malaya or southwest Siam.22  While such immigration studies 
had previously been conducted by the association in conjunction with government 
officials as mentioned in the earlier chapter, this particular study was curious in 
that it was carried out under strict instructions to keep its governmental origins 
secret.23  Such secrecy was apparently to prevent arousing British suspicion and 
possible interference regarding the project, which came to fruition in the form of 
twenty Japanese families settling in the Cameron Highlands from 1936, on a 
much smaller scale than originally envisioned and ultimately proved a failure.24
                                                          
21 Ibid., p.135;  van Mook, The Netherlands Indies and Japan, pp.17-19.
22 Hara Fujio, Eiryō maraya no nihonjin  英領マラヤの日本人 (Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyūjo, 
1986), p.75. 
23 Ibid.
24 Akashi Yōji, “Nanyō Kyōkai 1915-1945”, Shakai Kagaku Tōkyū, 40, 2 (December 1994), pp.9-
10.
73
Anglo-Japanese ties had generally been on the decline since the lapsing of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922, and Japanese manouevres in Manchuria and 
Shanghai in 1931 and 1932, followed by Japan’s withdrawal from the League of 
Nations in 1933 only served to cause further decline in bilateral ties, although 
there had been attempts to repair relations from 1934 to 1937. 25 Besides 
deteriorating relations between London and Tokyo, the new Governor of the 
Straits Settlements and High Commissioner of the Malay States Shenton Thomas 
who assumed office in November 1934 felt that increased surveillance of the local 
Japanese population was necessary, as he believed the Japanese were planning 
towards a systemized colonization of Malaya.26   The emigration project was 
naturally a suspicious venture in his eyes, and although he was unable to stop the 
settlement of these Japanese families in the Cameron Highlands under the 
provisions of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and 
Britain and overt discriminatory legislation might prove overly provocative, he 
nonetheless attempted to find ways to prevent the Japanese settlement from 
expanding and gaining more lands in the Cameron Highlands  while continuing to 
keep them under surveillance, following advice from the Foreign Office.27  This 
was thus the context in which the emigration project was implemented. Despite 
the secrecy that surrounded this study and project, it could still be seen as a 
continuation of the association’s original mission and activities in the first decade, 
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which included the promotion of emigration to the nanyō as a means of easing 
overpopulation in Japan.  
            Within the realm of education the Nanyō Kyōkai saw both continuity and 
change, though change was of a lesser degree than continuity. Continuity was 
with regards to its public lectures and language courses while change came in the 
limited form of the revival of the commercial apprenticeship programme.  
             Little can be said regarding the Dutch and Malay language courses 
conducted by the association beyond their continuation.28 Likewise the lecture 
series continued with the same speakers from the earlier decade, or of similar 
occupational backgrounds presenting on pretty much the same range of topics.29  
In the next decade a much greater degree of governmental interest would be 
demonstrated in these lectures not due to any significant change in the content of 
the lectures but as the result of international events and shifts in government 
policy, details of which would be covered in the next chapter.  
            The re-commencement of the commercial apprenticeship programme on a 
larger scale was probably the highlight among the association’s educational 
activities. Restarted in 1929 at the request of businesses and financed by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was also heavily involved in planning the 
programme and selecting candidates, it sought not only to equip participants with 
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local knowledge for conducting business in the region as had been the case for the 
first training programme but also to support them in setting up their own 
enterprises. 30   Titled the Nanpō Shōgyō Jisshūsei Seido (Southern Business 
Training Institution 南方商業実習生制度), it aimed to provide middle high 
school graduates with practical skills in business, with the long term goal of 
countering Chinese boycotts and expanding Japan’s export market.31
            Training consisted of a two-and-a half-month orientation within Japan 
followed by a five year apprenticeship with Japanese shop owners in the nanyō, at 
the end of which trainees would be assessed by shop owners as well as officials 
from the consulates and Nanyō Kyōkai and divided into two groups, A and B 
according to performance.32 Those from the A Group would be granted a non-
interest loan of between ¥1000-2000 together with a merchandise credit of around 
¥500 by the shop owners they had been apprenticed to in order to set up their own 
businesses.33 In the occasion that this could not be provided by individual shop 
owners, the Nanyō Kyōkai would step in to provide similar financial assistance.34
As for candidates in Group B, they could continue to work in the shops they had 
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been apprenticed to, or should they decide otherwise, the Nanyō Kyōkai could 
provide guidance and mediation, subject to the association’s discretion.35
          This programme continued until 1943, much longer than its previous 
incarnation and arguably made a greater impact by virtue of its longevity and the 
far larger number of people trained. Of the 798 young men that went through this 
programme, 669 remained in the region and 116 of them set up their own shops 
but in the final assessment the programme can only be said to have limited 
success in fulfilling its aims. 36 A chief factor behind the creation of the 
programme was the disruptive effects of anti-Japanese economic agitation on the 
part of the overseas Chinese in the region. The training programme was thus 
aimed at providing Japanese trade with a measure of immunity to such activities 
through strengthening Japan’s retail network in the region. Yet when anti-
Japanese boycotts met with little success, such as in Thailand in 1928 and 1931, 
the reasons behind their limited impact consisted of government displeasure and 
swift action against agitators, entrenchment of the Japanese gains in local trade 
made during WWI, establishment of direct shipping routes by Japanese 
companies weakening Chinese grip on local distribution, intertwined Chinese and 
Japanese economic interests that translated into a lack of enthusiasm for boycotts, 
the presence of Indian retailers willing to capitalize on Chinese boycotts and 
distribute Japanese goods, the fall in prices of Japanese goods following the 
dramatic devaluation of the Japanese yen from December 1931 onwards, and the 
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improved quality of Japanese goods that raised their competiveness.37   When 
faced with the more intense boycotts arising from the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 
onwards, Japanese trade with the region was badly affected, registering declines 
of between fifty and seventy percent in some territories, though the strains of the 
war effort on Japan probably accounted in part for the decline in the volume of 
exports to the South Seas as well.38  The programme and the increase in Japanese 
retailers through the programme does not appear to have made much of an impact,
with the 1931 boycotts started when the first batch of trainees were still serving 
their apprenticeships, and seemingly unable to counter the intense boycotts of 
1937. The outbreak of war with China and the invasion of the South Seas were 
further complications occurring too soon after the commencement of the 
programme to make assessment of its impact difficult. Following Japan’s 
invasion and occupation of the region 150 of these men were drafted for military 
administration by the 16th Army in Java, a development beyond the original 
hopes for the programme and not what its planners could have predicted but in 
terms of outcome, cannot be ignored as having trained personnel suitable for 
administering the occupied territories.39
             Lobbying was another aspect of the association’s activities continued with 
great vigour during this period, especially since two events with undesirable 
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effects for Japanese economic activities in the region occurred, causing great 
concern not only to the association but also businesses and residents within the 
Nanyō. 
             The first of these events was the closure of most of its branches in the 
region by the Bank of Taiwan on the 18th of April, 1927, triggering panicked 
responses and a series of telegrams to the association’s Commercial Museums in 
Singapore and Surabaya as well as its branches.40 The causes of this closure lay in 
the financial and operational woes the bank had been suffering from for some 
time due to the post-war economic slump and excessive lending.41 Perceived by 
the association as an event that could destroy the foundations of Japanese 
economic enterprise in the region, it swiftly took action to resolve the crisis by 
making representations to the Japanese cabinet.  This resulted in government 
funding that enabled the Bank of Taiwan to re-open its branches and continue 
operating, to the relief of many businessmen. 42 Although the association 
contributed greatly to this outcome, effectively utilizing its connections with the 
government the latter’s willingness to act on this issue was the key to its 
successful conclusion. 
             The other issue that saw significant lobbying efforts from the association 
was the enactment of the Crisis Import ordinance and imposition of import quotas 
on Japanese goods by the Dutch colonial government in 1934, the causes of which 
have been covered earlier in discussing Japanese economic interactions with the 
                                                          




region and the association’s research activities.43 In comparison to the case of the 
Bank of Taiwan, this was clearly a much more difficult issue requiring 
negotiations between the two governments in which the association’s actions 
could have little effect, if any, since government and association perceptions on 
the issue were unlikely to diverge significantly in any case. The association 
submitted representations thrice in support of the government position, a proposal 
requesting for inclusion of business leaders and specialists to the delegation, and 
twice made appeals to the Governor General of the NEI, the president and vice-
president of the Volksraad and the Minister of Colonial Affairs to amend or 
rescind the ordinance, but to little avail, due to Dutch concerns over not just the 
worsening balance of trade between the NEI and Japan, but also the political risks 
of allowing Japanese imports to continue growing unchecked in the NEI.44  
             From the above overview of various aspects of the association’s activities 
it is clear that continuity was the dominant trend during this period. Changes 
tended to be of a limited nature, in terms of reviving the commercial training 
scheme or in the manner it conducted its activities, as witnessed in the case of the 
emigration feasibility study.  The factors behind both of these examples of change 
was funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and directions from the 
Colonial Ministry. Government influence was again to be behind a more 
significant instance of change in this period—the beginning of propaganda 
activities on Gaimushō directives.
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            The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 triggered a new wave of 
anti-Japanese boycotts led by the overseas Chinese in the Nanyō.45 More than the 
economic impact of these protests, assessed to have been on a very limited scale, 
the Gaimushō was concerned about the possible impact on world opinion.46 The 
Japanese government, well aware that events in East Asia were watched keenly 
by foreign powers had already been making efforts to win the understanding and 
goodwill of foreign states in what was akin to a propaganda war with China.47   
International opinion towards Japan had been badly affected by not just the 
Manchurian Incident but the subsequent aerial bombing in early October of 
Chinchou, a provincial capital on the China owned Peking-Mukden railway 
located approximately 150 miles away from Japan’s railway zone on the pretext 
of pre-empting a Chinese counter attack. 48   This latter event had provoked 
international protests, with Washington in particular making its annoyance 
known.49 Having considered the role played by newspapers published by the 
overseas Chinese in fanning the flames of protest, the Ministry decided to take a 
two-pronged approach of requesting colonial authorities to clamp down on the 
protests on one hand while using the Nanyō Kyōkai on the other hand to engage 
in counter-propaganda.50 These were precursors to later propaganda efforts in the 
1930s in the form of promoting Manchukuo as a tourist destination packaged as a 
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modern city of the future, carrying the message of the modernity Japan had 
brought to Manchuria and by extension its qualification as Asia’s leader by virtue 
of its implied ability to do the same for the rest of Asia.51  
                Understanding that the economic clout as well as the strength of the 
overseas Chinese media could not be countered solely by the Japanese consulates, 
the Gaimushō decided to rope in the Nanyō Kyōkai, which had not only 
established its presence in the region but also had well-known personalities within 
its membership and had engaged official and non-official personalities of the 
region in its work.52 While part of the association’s self-prescribed mission right 
from the beginning included spreading knowledge of Japan in the Nanyō, little 
effort had been devoted to this area thus far, and carried out mainly in the form of 
exhibiting Japanese products in its commercial museums in Singapore and 
Surabaya. The propaganda activities it embarked upon at the direction of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1931 onwards were for a different purpose and 
consequently of quite a different nature than prior limited efforts to inform the 
region about Japan. These activities included the printing and dissemination of 
pamphlets in different languages to be issued in the name of association 
presidents past and present, collecting information on the situation, visiting 
influential persons, welcoming dignitaries from the region when they visited 
Japan, and submitting articles to newspapers and magazines.53  In view of the 
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general attitude of support and enthusiasm in both the production and 
consumption aspects of propaganda among the Japanese public during this period, 
it is likely that the association and its members saw no issue in participating in 
propaganda activities regarding the Manchurian Incident.54 As the association 
began to take on these new activities, Gaimushō funding for the commercial 
apprenticeship programme which had been cut in 1931 as the result of the Great 
Depression and shrinking government budgets was not only reinstated in 1932 but 
even doubled in 1933, followed by another increase in 1934.55 This is perhaps 
best understood partly as greater appreciation of the programme’s value following 
the happenings of 1931, and partly as rewarding the association’s propaganda 
efforts on behalf of the Ministry.
             As 1935 drew to a close, marking the end of the second decade of the 
Nanyō Kyōkai, the activities of the association were still mainly continuations of 
those started in the early years after its founding. Although there was one case of 
an arrest of a member, Nishimura Yoshio, head of the Singapore branch of the 
Ishihara Sangyō as well as President of the Japanese Association in Singapore on 
charges of spying in December 1934, there was little evidence otherwise that the 
association had engaged in espionage during this period, before the Japanese saw 
the region as an area for territorial expansion, as alleged by Eric Robertson in The 
Japanese File. 56 Whether there was truth in the charges remains unknown, as 
Nishimura died in British custody before investigations were concluded, possibly 
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by committing suicide.57  The official history of the Japanese Association gives 
the cause of death as a heart attack, without making direct reference to his arrest.58
On the other hand it appears that the owner of the Ishihara Sangyō, the 
aforementioned Ishihara Hiroichirō who by the 1930s was actively involved in 
right-wing politics in Japan and advocacy of nanshin as the solution to Japan’s 
problems had allowed the offices of his varied enterprises in the region to be used
as a cover for espionage, with the Nishimura case supposedly the mere tip of the 
iceberg.59  In any case this was a period in which government interest in and 
policy towards the region was still mainly in economic terms of expanding trade 
and exports, with some sectors further interested in it as a destination for Japanese 
migrants.  Sharing the same outlook, the association worked closely with the 
government in pursuit of these aims, but signs of possible changes to come were 
in the air by mid-1935.  Following the establishment of the Committee for the 
Study of a Policy towards the South Seas within the Naval General Staff in July 
1935, lecture sessions conducted by the association began to see regular 
attendance by naval staff officers, a trend that continued into the next decade in 
conjunction with signs of a shift in government policy.60  With the manifestation 
of these signs of change in the last decade of the association’s history due for 
discussion in the next chapter, this chapter will move on to the comparison of the 
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association and similar organizations in order to attain a fuller understanding of 
the association in its proper historical context.
For different purposes and under different conditions: Japanese research and other 
activities in foreign territories
             Japan’s involvement and influence in various overseas territories in Asia 
between the end of the 19th-century and 1945 varied in extent from territory to 
territory, but a commonality existed in the projects undertaken to create and 
disseminate knowledge that could form the basis of future action in terms of the 
vast quantity and highly detailed information collected and collated. The quality 
of these knowledge producing efforts in Taiwan, parts of China, Korea, 
Manchuria and the Nanyō are such that scholars researching these regions over 
this period of time often refer to them as reliable sources of information, made 
more valuable when alternative sources of data often do not exist. To place things 
in perspective, Japanese censuses in Taiwan were carried out at more intensive 
intervals and with greater accuracy than the well-known example of British 
censuses in India.61  
              The organizations to be compared and contrasted with the Nanyō Kyōkai 
are the Tōyō Kyōkai, the Tōa Dōbunkai, and the South Manchurian Railway 
Company, focusing on its research department. The Tōyō Kyōkai makes a good 
example for comparison because its activities and mission shared great 
similarities with the Nanyō Kyōkai, but operated in territories under Japanese 
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control or influence, unlike the Nanyō Kyōkai. On the other hand, the Tōa 
Dōbunkai constitutes another good candidate for comparison, not only because it 
shared similarities in mission and activities with the Nanyō Kyōkai, but also 
because of a degree of similarity in the circumstances in which it operated in 
terms of being involved in a territory that was not under Japan’s control and in 
which Japanese interest and relations with underwent significant changes within 
the lifespan of the organization. Comparison with the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Tōa 
Dōbunkai will thus cover more aspects than with the SMR. With regards to the 
SMR, it was a very different organization from either the Tōyō Kyōkai or the 
Nanyō Kyōkai, but was also similarly very active in research and dissemination of 
the information gathered. There are also parallels that can be drawn between its 
history and the Nanyō Kyōkai’s in the 1930s and during WWII, although most of 
this will come under discussion in the next chapter. Japanese production of 
colonial knowledge as undertaken by governing agencies will also be brought in 
to get a better sense of any commonalities that may have existed in the ideas and 
imperatives that were likely to have driven these research projects during Japan’s 
relatively brief age of empire. 
              While comparison with Western colonial projects of knowledge 
production could perhaps make for a more meaningful discussion, due to space 
constraints an attempt at comparing and contrasting these efforts with the Nanyō 
Kyōkai will be impossible. Besides, abundant scholarship on Western production 
of colonial knowledge has already been conducted, with much less attention paid 
to the Japanese example. Furthermore, the historical context and conditions in 
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which these Western projects began and ended were significantly different from 
those in which the Japanese projects were undertaken, though undoubtedly there 
were overlaps between the last phase of the period of Western overseas 
imperialism and more or less the entire phase of modern Japanese imperialism. 
Suffice it to say that the Japanese were aware of these Western projects of 
producing knowledge in service of governmentality, learning from them as they 
did many aspects of Western culture after 1868.  For instance, the compiling and 
application of statistics in governing Taiwan, undertaken with great enthusiasm 
by the Japanese immediately after taking control of the island drew upon the 
European colonialism that had connected statistics with good governance by the 
time the Japanese became colonial masters in Taiwan.62 The rest of this chapter 
will thus be devoted to a discussion of these Japanese organizations beginning 
from their genesis and following their development and activities until 
approximately 1935, to be picked up once more in the next chapter together with 
the discussion of the last phase of nanshin and the Nanyō Kyōkai.
               The oldest among the four geographically specific organizations, and 
also the one that shared the greatest similarities with the Nanyō Kyōkai was the 
Tōyō Kyōkai. In fact, prior to the Nanyō Kyōkai’s refounding in 1915 it had 
studied the Tōyō Kyōkai as an example.63 Formally founded in April 1898 as the 
Taiwankai (台湾会) to support Taiwan’s development, the geographical scope of 
its activities was initially limited to Taiwan, but expanded to include Korea and 
Manchuria when it was renamed the Tōyō Kyōkai in 1907 following Japanese 
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expansion into these two territories.64 There was thus a degree of similarity in the 
circumstances leading to each organization’s founding in terms of the connection 
to Japan’s territorial expansion, though this was a greater factor in the Tōyō 
Kyōkai’s case, for the founding of the Nanyō Kyōkai did not so much result from 
Japan’s advance during WWI into the Pacific islands formerly held by the 
Germans as from the dramatic wartime increase in trade with the Nanyō.
           Founded in the same year as the Taiwankai but in the later month of 
November, the Tōa Dōbunkai’s founding principles were couched in the idealistic 
terms of preserving China, helping to improve China, study the current affairs of 
China and take appropriate action and inspire public discussion.65  Its founding 
thus contained, to a certain extent, a greater measure of idealism than any of the 
three other organizations under discussion in terms of solidarity with China in 
facing the common threat from the West, but it was an idealism that was 
nonetheless tempered by a self-interested consciousness of Japan’s emerging 
interests in the Asian mainland and the threat posed to it by Western 
imperialism.66 As with the case of all of these organizations, the historical context 
surrounding its founding would influence individual characteristics. Right from 
the beginning there were close connections between the Tōa Dōbunkai and the 
Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with much of 
its funding derived from secret funds provided by the Ministry and consuls of 
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cities in which it had branches appointed as branch heads.67   Politicians and 
bureaucrats were also heavily represented in its membership. 68   Such close 
connections, manifested clearly in the form of direct reporting to the Gaimushō 
and tweaking of research programmes and personnel placements in response to 
Ministry needs and requests would endure till the breakup of the Tōa Dōbunkai.69    
         Similarities were thus present in the characteristic and membership of these 
three organizations. All were semi-private, semi-public organizations with 
overseas branches not affiliated to any political party or platform, devoted to 
providing information and promoting economic interest in their respective 
geographical regions through conducting research and disseminating its findings, 
lobbying, mediation, and training personnel, though.70  Membership came from 
the same groups of people, namely bureaucrats, businessmen, politicians, military 
officials and scholars, with not only membership but also leadership overlapping, 
particularly for the Nanyō Kyōkai and the Tōyō Kyōkai.71
        The means and methods through which these organizations sought to fulfill 
their aims were again greatly similar, though there were of course differences 
arising from disparities in the relationship between Japan and the territories each 
organization was involved with and what each organization hoped to achieve. The 
realm of education was one in which significant differences in both the purpose 
and scales of projects run by the three organizations were observable.  Before the 
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mid-1930s the Nanyō Kyōkai was not involved in the training of civil servants for 
Japanese administration of oversea territories and limited itself to training for 
commerce, with the governing of the Carolines, Marshalls and Marianas islands 
that were part of the Nanyō unrelated to the association, unlike the Tōyō Kyōkai 
which trained personnel to work in both public and private sectors in Taiwan, 
Korea and Manchuria. 72 This resulted from the fact that Japan was not the 
colonial master of most of the Nanyō and took a different kind of interest in the 
region, unlike the case of the territories with which the Tōyō Kyōkai was 
concerned with. Furthermore, the administration of the relatively much smaller 
Pacific islands with their relatively less complex local conditions did not require 
efforts on a similar scale as Taiwan or Korea, thus presenting no need for the 
Nanyō Kyōkai to provide training in this field. As it was Japanese rule in 
Micronesia under the Nanyō-chō was the most intensive the local inhabitants had 
experienced, with the close to 950 administrators by the mid-1930s an exponential 
increase from the 25 German bureaucrats formerly in charge of the islands.73  
With its officials drawn from the metropolitan civil service or the bureaucracies of 
other Japanese colonies, the Nanyō-chō had no need for external help in staffing 
its offices.74    
           In contrast, the Tōyō Kyōkai founded a technical college in 1900 that 
became a university, Takushoku University, in 1922.75 Inspired by the training of 
British colonial administrators, the original intention of the college was 
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developing talent to work in Taiwan’s public and private sectors, with 
approximately half of its first graduating class entering the Taiwan Government-
General, though the places its graduates worked in would become more varied 
along with a greater proportion joining the private sector in later years.76 The 
Tōyō Kyōkai also founded a branch college in Seoul in 1907, followed by 
commercial schools in Dairen and Taipei in 1910 and 1919, and two language 
schools in Port Arthur and Changchun respectively in 1910 and 1932. 77  
Compared to the Nanyō Kyōkai’s commercial training programmes and language 
courses, the educational projects of the Tōyō Kyōkai were undoubtedly conducted 
on a much greater scale with higher degrees of organization and continuity.
              As for the Tōa Dōbunkai, furthering mutual friendship between Japanese 
and Chinese youths through educating them together at a common school was the 
initial ideals behind the founding of the Tōa Dōbun Shoin in 1900, an education 
programme that lasted until 1945.78 However following involvement in Sun Yat-
sen’s planned revolution in 1900 by a number of Shoin staff and students as well 
as the evacuation of the original campus in Nanking amidst the chaos caused by 
the Boxer Rebellion, the school would be reorganized and the original ideal of 
educating Japanese and Chinese students together would be abandoned with the 
creation of separate campuses.79 The Chinese Division of the school, founded in 
1922 after years of declining Chinese enrolment following Japan’s Twenty-One 
Demands of 1915 would come to an end in 1934 following the graduation of its 
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last three Chinese students amidst steadily worsening bilateral ties.80 Having 
graduated less than 10 percent of the original planned quota of Chinese students, 
the aim of promoting mutual friendship and understanding through education can 
be said to have been a failure, with Japanese expansionism in China one major 
factor behind this outcome.81  The key achievement of the school, however, was 
in training a generation of China experts familiar. By 1945 over 5000 Japanese 
students would have passed through the school, with over 3,600 of them 
graduating.82 The curriculum of the Shoin included language training in spoken, 
written and business Chinese and English, training in library and research 
methods as well as travel and field research training equipping students with 
extensive knowledge of China’s interior.83 Language training formed the core of 
education at the Shoin, a situation that was understandable as research and 
fieldwork in China could not be effectively undertaken without a good grasp of 
the language.84  Fieldwork was a highlight of Shoin education, with teams of 
student blanketing the whole of China through their field trips that lasted between 
45 to 100 days, and their notes compiled as research reports that were forwarded 
to government agencies including the Army General Staff, the Gaimushō and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce for reference, while also edited for public 
consumption in the form of multi-volume monographs. 85 Such public funded 
research was connected to government needs and policies, and was also 
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distributed to the business world, from which the Tōa Dōbunkai also accepted 
requests for information and research.86 The aims, programmes and outcomes of 
each organization’s education activities were thus greatly different.
              Having seen the connections between education and research in the case 
of the Tōa Dōbunkai, the discussion will now shift to a comparison of the
research and lobbying activities of the Nanyō Kyōkai and the Tōyō Kyōkai. The 
Tōa Dōbunkai is not discussed in this section as it appears to have undertaken 
minimal lobbying efforts, being more akin to docile collectors and providers of 
information for government planning purposes, perhaps offering encouragement 
for Japanese expansionism in China at the most.87 Although it had attempted to 
shape public opinion in relation to stirring up national consciousness among the 
Chinese in China through publishing a series of newspapers in its early, idealistic 
days, such activities had stopped after the Boxer Rebellion.88   
          In lobbying and research differences between the two organizations were 
less significant. Understandably the topics and issues each association was 
concerned with would diverge greatly, but otherwise notable similarities existed, 
unsurprising since the Nanyō Kyōkai had modeled itself after the Tōyō Kyōkai to 
some extent. The Tōyō Kyōkai, in putting out a monthly journal providing 
information on Taiwan and East Asia from 1898 focusing on economic issues 
with some other pieces on history, culture, travelogues and political opinions was 
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clearly an example for the Nanyō Kyōkai’s own journal.89 A separate weekly 
newspaper, an academic journal and numerous research booklets on specific 
topics were also platforms for disseminating information, together with lecture 
tours and exhibitions on a range of issues.90 The Tōyō Kyōkai’s publishing 
output was however more diverse than the Nanyō Kyōkai’s, as it also published a 
quarterly academic journal, Tōyō Gakuhō. Edited by the academic section of its 
research department, articles in this journal were devoted to serious study
historical, cultural and linguistic issues in East Asia. For example, there was an 
almost 100-page long article in its December 1929 issue on the presence of 
Mongolian terms in Korean histories contributed by prominent scholar Shiratori 
Kurakichi. 91   There was nothing comparable within the Nanyō Kyōkai’s 
publications. On the other hand, the Nanyō Kyōkai’s commercial museums, 
assessed to have been a significant part of its research-related activities drew 
inspiration elsewhere, for there was nothing similar in the Tōyō Kyōkai’s history. 
Given the vast amount of detailed statistics collected and compiled by the colonial 
authorities in Taiwan ranging from sunrise times to the total number of sheep and 
postal packages sent by the locals, making it quite possibly the “most thoroughly 
inventoried colonial area in the world”, it was likely that the information put out 
by the Tōyō Kyōkai, with the exception of Tōyō Gakuhō played a supportive role 
to the official project of creating colonial knowledge, unlike the Nanyō Kyōkai 
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whose role was more that of providing information which was sorely lacking in 
Japan.92
             Both associations also utilized their connections to lobby regarding issues 
they were interested in. Examples of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s activities in this field 
have been covered in prior chapters; an example of the Tōyō Kyōkai’s lobbying 
efforts was related to talks regarding the normalization of Russo-Japanese ties in 
the mid-1920s. Not only did numerous articles calling for increased trade and 
cooperation between the two nations appear in Tōyō Kyōkai’s publications, it was 
also able to have a direct influence over the issue through Gōtō Shinpei, who was 
the association’s president at the time as well as mayor of Tokyo (1920 -1923) 
and Home Affairs Minister (1923-1924).93 Despite not holding an official post 
dealing with foreign affairs, Gōtō obtained the Prime Minister’s permission to 
negotiate with the Russians, and when he came under criticism from other 
politicians, the Tōyō Kyōkai countered his critics by obtaining and publishing 
statements in support of Gōtō from other prominent personalities.94 Clearly, both 
organizations successfully used their political connections in lobbying. 
             An issue closely related to lobbying was the functions these associations 
served for its members. Membership in these organizations and taking up issues 
related to these regions with the government provided the means through which 
one could network with people in political and business circles, as well as 
maintain a certain level of prominence, especially for those without an official 
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post at one time or another.95 This goes some way in explaining the ability of both 
associations in attracting and retaining members from political and business 
circles throughout their history.
          In terms of funding sources, the Tōyō Kyōkai also received government 
funding, but was apparently less dependent on such funding sources and had 
greater success in generating its own income through selling advertisement space 
in its publications and investments in stocks and real estate as well as soliciting 
private donations when compared to the Nanyō Kyōkai.96  Evidence of this can be 
seen in how the withdrawing of Gaimushō funding for the Nanyō Kyōkai’s 
training programme in 1931 had threatened its continuation and was only resolved 
with the reinstatement of funding, whereas when Takushoku University which 
had been founded by the Tōyō Kyōkai required an endowment of ¥500,000 in 
1921 to gain accreditation as a new university, it was able to get a number of 
sugar manufacturing companies based in Taiwan to donate this amount which was 
beyond the association’s means. 97   Such differences in circumstances can be 
attributed to the presence of larger and more concrete Japanese interests in the 
East Asian territories, which translated into greater ability and willingness to 
support the Tōyō Kyōkai’s activities.
            From the above discussion it can be seen that there were many similarities 
between both organizations across all areas of their activities, with much of the 
differences arising from the circumstances in which each operated, namely the 
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relationship of the overseas territories with Japan which shaped the nature and 
scale of the needs and issues each association was concerned with and their 
respective responses.  The Tōa Dōbunkai, while sharing certain similarities with 
both the Nanyō Kyōkai and the Tōyō Kyōkai, was a fairly different organization 
with an arguably narrower range of activities beyond its preoccupations of 
research and education by the time of the Nanyō Kyōkai’s founding.98
            In contrast to the other three organizations, the SMR and its research 
branch was a significantly different creature altogether. Far from being a 
voluntary organization, the SMR began as a semi-official joint-stock venture, 
created through an imperial ordinance in November 1906 as a railway company to 
manage Japanese economic interests in southern Manchuria, a company that has 
been described as having the appearance of a commercial enterprise but in reality 
worked as a state organization to implement colonial rule and colonization.99 Not 
only did the cabinet had the final say in the company’s operations, its top leaders 
were appointed by the Prime Minister, its board of directors decided through the 
dual process of shareholder elections and cabinet combination.100  The SMR’s
primary mission was the colonization of Northeast China, with the railway 
serving as the technical tool of imperial reconstruction just as it had served the 
nation-building needs of Europe and the USA.101  Gōtō Shinpei, former colonial 
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administrator in Taiwan, first President of the SMR and future President of the 
Tōyō Kyōkai, among his many other roles, has been credited with coming up with 
the concept of the SMR, intending for it to govern the railway system separately 
from any administrative area that might come under Japanese governance, and 
possessing research and development capabilities to exploit Manchuria’s rich 
resources.102 Owning and managing approximately 700 miles of railway lines, 
attached areas of land on both sides of these tracks that totaled around 233 sq. km 
by 1931, and the properties within these areas which included hospitals, schools, 
mines and factories, the SMR was a large and highly profitable company for most 
of its history. 
            The entire range of activities carried out by this massive enterprise has 
been amply covered by scholars of the company and most of it will not be 
discussed here, being too starkly different from any activity of the Nanyō Kyōkai 
to allow for meaningful comparison and contrast. Its research branch, however, 
makes for interesting comparison with the Nanyō Kyōkai and even the Tōyō 
Kyōkai, having been created by Gōtō who offers some insight into the mindsets of 
the groups of influential personalities behind these Japanese projects of 
knowledge production. Moreover, it has been assessed as having been at the 
frontline of research activities related to various stages of Japan’s imperial 
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advance into Asia, a role the Nanyō Kyōkai has similarly been described as 
having fulfilled. 103
            An important reason behind the creation of the research department was 
the belief that the SMR could not survive in the conditions of instability following 
the Russo-Japanese war and the complex play of interests between Japan, Russia, 
China and America in Manchuria without access to precise and up-to-date 
information required to formulate the best course of action.104  Thus from the 
beginning the SMR’s research organs were intended to support SMR operations 
and expand Japanese interests, even if their researchers may not always appear to 
keep this in mind. The other main reason was Gōtō’s well-known deep interest in 
research, considering research to be indispensible to colonial management.105
Thus, the Research Department was founded in April 1907, shortly after the SMR 
began operations, in an era in which it was rare for a Japanese company to have 
its own research department, the only other example being Mitsui. 
            The research branch began with three sub-divisions that reflected the 
needs and concerns of the SMR as perceived by its leadership: economics, old 
customs, and Russia. 106 The economics division examined the industries of 
Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia, covering agriculture, trade, finance, railways, 
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water transport, transport and geography; the customs division focused on land 
use and distribution in Manchuria, including Chinese laws, while the Russia 
division gathered information related to this regional power still perceived as a 
threat to Japanese interests in Manchuria.107  SMR’s research organs were further 
strengthened with the founding of the Tōa keizai chōsakyoku (東亜経済調査局) 
in January 1908, headquartered in SMR’s  Tokyo branch, with the mission of 
collecting international economic information of relevance to nation and company 
and answering related queries, thus serving the dual function of collecting and 
disseminating information.108
            The SMR’s research organs were not dissimilar to the Nanyō Kyōkai in 
terms of research topics and the supplying of information, but there were clear 
differences in impact. The Nanyō Kyōkai could only seek to promote economic 
interaction with the South Seas through presenting the region’s bountiful 
resources through its research, but the information collected by the SMR’s 
research organs served the concrete purpose of supporting the management of 
Manchuria and SMR operations.109 This was not only the product of different 
scale of national interests, but also directly related to the missions each gave itself 
or was given from the start. 
           September 1931 was a major turning point for SMR and its research 
department, and a similar historical trajectory can be seen between its history 
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from this point onwards and the Nanyō Kyōkai’s post-1937 as Japanese policy in 
general turned towards expansionism. However, the situation before 1931 was 
much more complex for the SMR’s research section than in the Nanyō Kyōkai’s 
case, with the impact of the military gradually gaining the upper hand in policy 
making also hitting the SMR much earlier.  
              Acting against directives from Tokyo, the Guandong Army staged an 
explosion on part of the SMR-controlled railways as a pretext to invade 
Manchuria, culminating in the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo.110
The Army looked to the research department for assistance in civil governance, 
but the influence of Marxism meant that many within it were disinclined to 
provide assistance.111 Yet even though many researchers at the SMR were known 
to be leftist thinkers, there were also a number of right wingers that had worked 
closely with the Guandong Army even before the Manchurian Incident, such as 
Miyazaki Masayoshi and Sada Kōjirō.112 Sada in particular arguably inspired the 
Manchurian Incident through his suggestions to the Army that creating an anti-
Japanese incident out of Chinese nationalism could reinforce Japanese control.113
Other researchers were less cooperative, to the dissatisfaction of the Army, but 
even these researchers needed the Army for protection in conducting fieldwork, 
thus limiting the extent to which they could disregard the Army’s wishes.114 Such 
ideological divisions were not present in the Nanyō Kyōkai and its research, 
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largely due to it being a voluntary organization with a membership consisting of 
people with less divergent ideas and its activities without the high stakes to which 
the SMR’s research was connected to.
            From 1932 onwards the research branch thus began to conduct research on 
the army’s behalf, beginning with the creation of the Mantetsu keizai chōsakai
( 満鉄経済調査会), tasked with research on Manchuria and Mongolia in order to 
assist army queries regarding policies and plans related to economic 
development.115  This organ has been described by SMR Director Sogō Shinji as 
an organ of the SMR on the surface, but in reality under the direction of the army, 
involved in policy making from the nation’s perspective that override the interests 
of the SMR and may even be involved in plans and policies that contradict the 
SMR’s interests.116 It was thus not purely a research organ, but a research and 
planning making agency that was intended to form an arm of the army.117 In this 
form it was involved in currency unification in Manchuria and in planning five 
year plans for industrialization that emphasized military related industries and 
were implemented as key policy from 1937 onwards.118
           On this note this chapter moves towards its conclusion, with discussion of 
the following decade to continue in the next chapter. A concern with gathering 
information and accumulating knowledge with regards to Japan’s dealings with 
overseas territories was clearly present during this period, demonstrating that men 
                                                          





like Gōtō who were aware of Western projects in this field and understood its 
value were not anomalies but existed in significant numbers. Through the above 
comparison and contrast it is clear that the Nanyō Kyōkai was not a unique entity, 
sharing many commonalities with the Tōyō Kyōkai, and a lesser number with the 
Tōa Dōbunkai. Looking at the various aspects of the research activities of these 
other organizations also provide a better idea of the historical context in which the 
Nanyō Kyōkai was founded and operated. While it was neither the first nor the 
only Japanese organization to engage in research regarding a foreign land and the 
packaging of this research as knowledge to be acted upon, there were 
considerable differences between the circumstances in which it and the other 
organizations operated as well as the significance attached to its research at this 
point in time. Change that would arguably narrow these circumstantial differences 




Change and Dissolution: the Nanyō Kyōkai in War and Occupation
         The Japanese cabinet’s adoption of nanshin-ron as an element of national 
policy in August 1936 heralded a new period of interest in the Nanyō, though the 
precise form in which this would be manifested was yet unknown. Kokusaku no 
kijun (国策の基準), as this policy paper was titled, outlined Japan’s basic policy 
in terms of securing its political and strategic position in East Asia, coupled with 
advancement into and the development of the South Seas.1  While nanshin was 
still couched in terms of peaceful economic advance in this document, following 
its adoption officers from the War Ministry, Army General Staff and Naval 
General Staff began to attend every public lecture conducted by the Nanyō 
Kyōkai, hinting at the quarters which were most interested in this policy and the 
form it was likely to take.2  
           Attendance of the association’s lectures by naval staff officers from mid-
1935 had been mentioned in the previous chapter, and it was precisely the Navy 
that had pushed for the policy of southward advance. Its establishment of a policy 
study committee for the region under the Naval Minister’s direct supervision in 
July 1935, to begin actively collecting and analyzing information on the region, 
                                                          
1 Fundamentals of National Policy, translated in Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
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was the earliest harbinger of more direct official interest in the Nanyō Kyōkai.3  
This chapter will thus follow the development of the Nanyō Kyōkai in the last 
decade of its history, through its re-organization to become what has been 
described as a dummy organization of the Japanese government, its taking on new 
projects in support of the overall war effort and Japanese occupation of the region 
during the Pacific War, until its final dissolution at the war’s concluding in 
Japan’s defeat. Picking up from where the comparison and contrast of the Nanyō 
Kyōkai left off in the previous chapter, discussion of the four organizations will 
continue, with the gap between conditions in which the Nanyō Kyōkai operated 
and the other organizations narrowing, but differences continue to exist in the 
roles they served in support of national policy, and in the ways they were affected 
by the events of this period.
Prelude to re-organization: Nanshin-ron in its expansionist stage and the Sino-
Japanese conflict 
           The last phase of nanshin-ron saw it adopted as an expansionist national 
policy that was no longer an alternative to the opposing idea of hokushin but an 
integral part of Japanese policy towards Asia and Russia. A 1936 policy paper of 
the Naval Headquarters demonstrated the above line of thinking, as well as 
containing further elements that would soon be embraced by the Japanese 
government in articulating its policy towards the region. Not only was the Nanyō 
described as greatly important for national defence and resolving Japan’s 
                                                          
3 Shimizu Hajime, Southeast Asia in Modern Japanese Thought: The Development and 
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population and economic problems as well as achieve Japanese policy towards 
Manchuria, China and Russia, expansion into the region was also couched in 
terms of an inevitable mission based upon the Imperial spirit, for the achievement 
of co-existence and co-prosperity.4  This development was closely tied to events 
of the 1930s that had led to a renewed sense of urgency to bolster Japan’s national 
security, as well as part of rising interest in expansionism that had emerged 
following Japanese expansion on the Asian continent from 1931 onwards. 5
Economic uncertainties following the onset of the Great Depression; a sense of 
international isolation post-Manchurian Incident; anxiety linked to the termination 
of the Washington Treaty Order and the end of Japan’s reliance on the principles 
of collective security all contributed to a renewed search for ways to strengthen 
national security, with the Nanyō and its resources coming into the picture as a 
means through which Japan’s military expansion could be achieved.6
              The perception of southward advance in terms of a mission or destiny 
was not limited to policy makers in government, but was also evident in the 
writings of individuals. Examples included famous journalist Murobuse Kōshin
(室伏高信)’s Nanshin Ron and linguist Shinmura Izuru (新村出)’s Nanpō Ki.7  
Murobuse’s work, which was received with widespread acclaim and re-ignited 
public interest in southward advance described nanshin as predestined national 
                                                          
4 Japan Navy Headquarters, “General Principles of National Policy”, April 1936, translated in 
Lebra, Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and 
Documents, pp.59-60. 
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mission and historical necessity, a panacea for all of Japan’s problems, while 
Shinmura proposed “an unconscious nostalgia for our beloved motherland” as the 
basis of Japan’s southward advance.8  Such concepts of destiny and a shared 
identity further fed into Pan-Asianist ideas focused upon the formation of an 
Asian federation under the guidance of the Japanese Emperor, all of which came 
together to form a strain of nanshin-ron greatly different from its Meiji and 
Taishō predecessors, one in which determinism, even fatalism was present in 
large doses. 9 Pan- Asianism in turn reflected the broader perception among 
Japanese intellectuals that the 1930s was a time of unique opportunity to effect
change domestically and in the rest of Asia, as well as their belief in the rightness 
of Japanese leadership of Asia.10 This goes some way in explaining the lack of 
opposition among Japanese intellectuals to their government’s policies during the 
1940s and after the outbreak of the Pacific War, for while the right-wing thinkers 
could easily see Japan’s southward expansion as a natural development of the 
Japanese people’s sacred mission, the leftists could visualize an end to 
colonialism and the end of Western influence in Asia.11
             Worsening ties and rising tensions between Japan and the USA, Britain 
and Netherlands as the 1930s wore on further contributed to increased interest in 
the Nanyō in the above-mentioned forms, but they remained merely possible 
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future courses of action for the time being. Yet the idea of southward advance can 
perhaps be said to be inching closer to realization from the mid-1930s onwards, as 
Planning Board bureaucrats responsible for formulating long-term policies also 
began to attend the Nanyō Kyōkai’s lecture meetings.12 From 1936 onwards the 
Navy also began studying the region, tapping other research groups as well as the 
Nanyō Kyōkai.13 It was apparent that these lectures and the association’s research 
had taken on a new significance, as sources of intelligence to be used in the 
planning of future policy, invasion plans and occupation policies.14  It was also 
clear that for all the years in which the association had been researching and 
disseminating knowledge on the region, a lack of information on it still prevailed 
in military policy making circles for such a sudden wave of interest to materialize 
once it was considered as an area of possible advance. Perhaps this lack of 
knowledge can be attributed to prior policy towards the region which did not 
require the military to take any serious interest in studying the region, until shifts 
in government policy altered the situation. 
           Despite the growing importance of the region and the association’s 
activities with regards to national policy, for the time being prevailing conditions 
did not necessitate bringing it under direct government control in the minds of 
those in power. This would change with the outbreak of full-scale war in China in 
July 1937. 
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Reorganization and the new Nanyō Kyōkai: Changes and Continuities 
           The Second Sino-Japanese war and the resulting imposition of economic 
sanctions on Japan by the Western powers raised the importance of the Nanyō and 
by extension the Nanyō Kyōkai as the leading organization dealing with the 
region in the eyes of Japanese policy makers. 15 This was to lead to the re-
organization of the association, turning it from a semi-government voluntary 
organization into an organization assisting the government in formulating policies 
for the region.16
             The process of reorganization had begun with the decision to bring 
Japanese voluntary and commercial organizations in the South Seas and their 
activities under direct government guidance, during the later half of 1937 in 
which an extended conflict in an expanded war theatre in China was deemed 
unavoidable by policy makers.17  While the idea of forming a new organization to 
serve such a function had initially been contemplated, it was decided after a study 
that the reorganization and expansion of the Nanyō Kyōkai provided a short cut. 
18   Following this decision, the Gaimushō began the process of reorganization 
and expansion from 1938 onwards, starting with changing the association’s status 
to a tax-free foundation (財団法人) that could no longer generate income through 
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members’ activities and shaking up its leadership.19  Inoue Masaji, founder and 
executive director for twenty-four years resigned together with vice President 
Fujiyama Raita, and were replaced by Hayashi Kyūjirō and Kodama Hideo 
respectively.20 Hayashi had been a career diplomat, serving as consul in Fengtian 
when the Manchurian Incident occurred and later as Ambassador to Brazil, 
whereas Kodama had formerly served as Colonial Minister, thus creating a 
leadership with a strong flavour of officialdom for the first time in the 
association’s history, even though it had always had close links with officials and 
bureaucrats.21  These changes were accompanied by an influx of funds from the 
Gaimushō, together with direct control of association activities that meant the loss 
of independence for the Nanyō Kyōkai. 22 In their inaugural speeches both 
Kodama and Hayashi focused on the theme of mutual and peaceful cooperation 
for the development of rich and untapped resources in the region, without 
neglecting the point that this was Japan’s mission, being closer geographically to 
the region than the Western powers, and in possession of talent and capital the 
indigenous peoples lacked.23 Such were the terms in which the discussion of 
nanshin was couched by the association, which at this point did not differ greatly 
from its pre-reorganization position.
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           Besides concerns created by the outbreak of war, several other reasons 
existed behind the Gaimushō’s path of action. The first was related to turf battles 
with the Army, Planning Board and Ministry of Trade and Industry regarding 
influence over the nanshin policy, with the reorganization and taking control of 
the Nanyō Kyōkai a means through which the Gaimushō attempted to maintain its 
influence in the face of attempts to its exclusion.24  Another key factor was its 
belief that direct control was necessary to effectively counter anti-Japanese 
movements in the region which had intensified following the outbreak of war.25  
The expansion of the commercial apprenticeship programme following the Nanyō 
Kyōkai’s re-organization and the provision of ¥135,000 in financial aid to the 
association was part of its plans to combat the boycotts of Japanese goods, with 
the association serving as a front for the Gaimushō amidst a climate of heightened 
suspicion towards Japanese economic expansion in which direct government 
action should appear minimal.26
          The possession of some measure of local networks in the Nanyō was 
another reason leading to the Nanyō Kyōkai’s re-organization. Having provided 
special reports regarding anti-Japanese movements in the region since the late 
1920s and propaganda services after 1931 to the Gaimushō, the association’s 
information networks in the form of its overseas commercial museums and 
branches, along with its connections with influential local personalities could be 
                                                          




directly utilized by the Gaimushō once the association was under its direct 
control.27   
           How did these changes translate into the association’s activities? Despite 
these organizational changes, the scope of activities appeared largely unchanged 
for the time being, without the taking on of new projects that can be seen as a new 
realm of activity. This was arguably due to the absence of further significant 
change in national policy towards the region, as well as the fact that the 
association in its current state could already serve the needs of the Gaimushō. The 
commercial apprenticeship continued to be conducted with the abovementioned 
expansion in terms of student intake, with little change otherwise. Research, 
publication and lobbying activities also continued as usual, but closer scrutiny 
would reveal new developments in terms of content and organization that has to 
be understood in the context of the imposition of direct control. It is thus in these 
areas that this study will start tracing the changes that took place in the 
association’s activities in this last decade of its history.
             The Nanyō Kyōkai remained active in research and publication, long a 
key focus of the association. Reflecting the changes that had taken place, the 
association began putting out certain materials that differed in nature and tone 
from those it had previously published, though it should not be exaggerated that 
the association had completely altered its publishing output between 1937 and 
1942. As mentioned in the previous chapter Japanese ties with the Western 
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colonial powers in the region had been on the decline for some time by 1937, and 
continued its downward spiral between 1937 and 1942. Japanese invasion of 
China stemming from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 had provoked the 
most intense anti-Japanese economic and propaganda campaigns up to that time 
on the part of the overseas Chinese, with boycotts and labour walkouts on 
enterprises such as the Ishihara Mining Company creating much difficulty for 
Japanese economic enterprises in the region.28 Japanese imports to the region fell 
sharply during this period, and while there was an overall slight recovery between 
1939 and 1940, perhaps due to trade disruption resulting from the outbreak of war 
in Europe, in certain territories such as Singapore, Malaya and the Philippines 
Japanese imports continued to decline in volume between 1937 and 1941.29
Western fears regarding Japanese intentions towards the region which had in part 
accounted for the imposition of trade restrictions from around 1934 onwards 
further contributed to a deteriorating environment for Japanese economic ventures 
in the region, with the trade restrictions and what was perceived as softness on the 
part of the colonial governments in dealing with anti-Japanese activities adding to 
tensions between Japan and the region’s colonial governments.30 Such was the 
                                                          
28 Stephen Leong, “The Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941”, 
Journal of Southeast Asian  Studies 10,2 (September 1979), pp. 295-299; H.J. van Mook, The 
Netherlands Indies and Japan, their Relations 1940-1941 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1944), pp.22-23.
29 Yen Ching-hwang, The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and 
Politics (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002), pp.380.
30 Mark R. Peattie, “Nanshin: The “Southward Advance”, 1931-1941 as a Prelude to the Japanese 
Occupation of Southeast Asia, in The Japanese Wartime Empire 1931-1945, ed. Peter Duus, 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.204-205; 
Denis Koh Soo Jin and Tanaka Kyoko, “Japanese Competition in the Trade of Malaya in the 
1930s”, Southeast Asian Studies 21, 4 (March 1984), pp.392-393.
113
historical context in which the association’s research and publication activities 
continued.
           Proof of not having changed the contents of its research and publications 
completely can be seen in the continued publication of monographs on economic 
related matters, an example of which was a very detailed translation of regulations 
enacted in 1938 on the registration of trademarks in the Straits Settlements 
complete with copies of the registration forms and instructions on their 
completion, published in 1939.31  General works on the recent state of a country’s 
industries, such as the Dutch East Indies also featured in the association’s 
publications. There were also books on anti-Japanese activities in the region that 
were basically compilations of reports from the association journal, but even from 
an economic perspective such activities were bound to be of concern to the 
association. It was certainly not a new development for the association to monitor 
the situation and report accordingly, having done so since at least the 1920s when 
sporadic instances of anti-Japanese sentiment would erupt, although such 
movements certainly intensified from the 1930s in response to rapidly 
deteriorating Sino-Japanese ties and Japanese expansionist moves.32
             However it was during this period that the association began to publish 
works regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict that were essentially justifications of 
Japan’s actions in China. Even though the association was known to have taken 
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on propaganda activities under the Gaimushō after 1932, it appears that such 
publications had not been produced prior to the outbreak of a full-scale war in 
1937 and the association’s reorganization. The association’s official history which 
stops at 1935 makes no mention of any such publications between 1932 and 1935, 
while literature searches also do not reveal the existence of similar works before 
1937. It is quite safe to say that this was a new area the Nanyō Kyōkai was 
venturing into by publishing these booklets of a propagandistic nature. Around 
twenty pages thick individually, these works sought to present a whitewashed 
account of Japan’s actions in China while at the same time emphasizing Japan’s 
ability to prevail despite its economic limitations.33  Accompanying photos of 
Japanese soldiers playing with Chinese children or Japanese medical teams 
immunizing Chinese civilians from cholera were criticisms of the Chinese 
Nationalist government’s policies under Chiang Kai-shek, which were presented 
as having inflicted tremendous losses and sufferings on the Chinese people 
without any acknowledgement of the dire effects of the actions and policies of the 
Japanese government. 34   Besides these Japanese booklets that presented 
questionable accounts of the peace arising in the occupied areas, an English 
language booklet titled The Sino-Japanese conflict and its causes was also 
published in 1938, demonstrating that the association was not only targeting the 
Japanese public but had also attempted to make its case to the English speaking 
world. Further attempts to communicate its perspective to the Western world took 
the form of an English version of the monthly journal that began publication in 
                                                          




April 1939, followed by a French version in April 1942.35   While the exact 
proportion of these works of propaganda among the publishing output of the 
association over this period is unknown due to the lack of a comprehensive list of 
publications and uncertainty over which titles survived the wartime upheaval and 
subsequent decades to remain in libraries today, it can be said with certainty that 
the association was active in publishing these works from 1938 onwards, with at 
least five separate titles still in existence today.36
   The association’s monthly journal also underwent similar changes. 
Publication continued, with the change in title from Nanyō Kyōkai Zasshi to 
Nanyō (南洋) in 1937 as an early indicator of the association’s reorganization, 
along with the undertaking to improve its contents by avoiding excessive 
specialization. 37   Besides reporting on anti-Japanese movements in various 
territories, the journal’s focus remained largely on economic topics such as the 
trade figures for the earlier part of the year, the imposition of import restrictions 
in British Malaya or the cost of living in certain territories.38 However one cannot 
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help noticing the changes in the preface to each volume. The January issue, for 
example, praised the heroic efforts of the Imperial Army in taking the 
“impregnable” city of Nanking and linked the association’s work in the South 
Seas to the war which was not expected to end anytime soon, in terms of 
providing the economic backing for the war effort through expanding Japan’s 
overseas market, thereby increasing Japan’s import earnings.39  This was to be the 
significance of the association’s work in the region.40  Following this, the preface 
of the March issue sought to explain how Japan’s intentions in the Sino-Japanese 
War had been misunderstood, placing the blame for the conflict on Chiang’s 
Nationalist government who had broken treaties and “bonds of friendship” , 
disturbed regional peace and allied itself with the Soviet Union.41 Contrasted with 
the lack of similar comments over the Manchurian Incident in 1931, this was clear 
evidence of organizational changes translating into editorial policy.
              With regards to lobbying, the main event over this period was the 
Conference on Nanyō Economic Affairs (南洋経済懇談会) held in Tokyo and 
Nagoya in September 1939, with representatives from almost all organizations 
concerned with the Nanyō adopting a series of resolutions regarding the 
promotion of export trade, protecting the business rights of Japanese merchants 
and improving the quality of Japanese education conducted in the region. 42
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Bureaucrats representing a range of government agencies and ministries including 
the Planning Board, Finance Ministry, Forestry Ministry, Taiwan Government 
General were also in attendance.43  These resolutions were later presented to the 
Japanese government with the request to be taken into consideration in policy 
making, but their impact is unknown and probably negligible, given the general 
mood of the times.44  What was more interesting about this event, however, was 
that it was in fact organized and carried out by the Gaimushō, from selecting 
representatives to deciding topics.45 Kawaharabayashi’s opinion on the event is 
that the Gaimushō had essentially used the Nanyō Kyōkai to create the façade of a 
gathering of private organizations, due to considerations that appearing to take a 
great role in promoting southward advance at this stage was not exactly 
beneficial.46  This argument is convincing, since even though the Gaimushō’s 
involvement in the event and the fact that it had the largest delegation among 
government representatives cannot be hidden through a perusal of the conference 
report, the report had originally been marked “top secret” when it was issued in 
1940.47 Moreover, the conference had attracted the attention of British security 
forces in the region.48 Even though their perception of the conference as an effort 
to consolidate propaganda efforts in the South Seas was some distance off the 
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mark, they were aware of the selection of delegates by Japan’s overseas 
consulates.49  This meant that overt involvement by the Gaimushō would likely 
have further raised Western suspicions regarding the Japanese presence in the 
region, and explains why the Gaimushō preferred to conceal its role in the 
conference’s organization, especially since its aim in organizing the conference 
appears to be the continued promotion of the policy of economic engagement with 
the region in Tokyo, to which end complications in the form of suspicions and 
interference by Western colonial authorities were best avoided, since they were 
likely to serve opposing calls for a new policy towards the region. 
             Through these aspects in which the association’s activities were altered, it 
was clear that its original characteristic of a semi-private, semi-official 
organization had been lost over this period, becoming more and more a 
government operated organization which has been referred to as an affiliated 
organization of the Gaimushō.50 Further developments in government policy from 
1939 onwards would bring about even greater changes for the association.
The final phase of nanshin-ron: Japanese conquest and occupation of the Nanyō 
and its impact on the Nanyō Kyōkai
             The decision to expand into the Nanyō was directly related to the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the punitive economic sanctions that 
followed. With a swift end to the conflict nowhere in sight and Japan’s need for 
resources growing increasingly acute, especially after the abrogation of the US-
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Japan Commerce and navigation Treaty in January 1940, a military advance into 
the resource rich region began increasingly to be perceived as inevitable.51  
                Following the rise in strategic and economic importance of the Nanyō, 
the region began to be incorporated into existing political concepts, with the 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” which included the region replacing the 
earlier concept of “the New Order in East Asia”.52   This was evident in the 
adoption of Kihon kokusaku yōkō (基本国策要綱) in July 1940, which called for 
establishing a new order in Greater East Asia on the basis of solidarity among 
Japan, Manchukuo and China as well as Imperial autarky in Greater East Asia.53  
It was quite obvious that the achievement of autarky was a key factor behind the 
Konoe Cabinet’s interest in the region. This official form of nanshin-ron also 
clearly perceived the region not as independent from the continent as Taishō 
nanshin-ron had, but as an extension of the continent.54  This was in some ways a 
return to earlier ideas regarding the region and its relation to Japan. 
          Further delineation of how this new order might be established took place at 
a liaison conference that same month between the government and Imperial 
headquarters, which concluded with the approval of Sekai jōsei no suii ni 
tomonau jikyoku shori yōkō ( 世界情勢の推移に伴う時局処理要綱 ), a 
document which not only called for the seizing of any opportunity to resolve the 
problems in the South Seas and bring about a solution to the conflict in China but 
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also stated the conditions under which military force may be deployed against the
Nanyō.55  These conditions expressed the preference for a settlement of the Sino-
Japanese War before seizing any opportunity to resolve the issues in the Nanyō so 
as to avoid war with a third power, but settlement in China was not a necessary 
pre-condition should circumstances develop in Japan’s favour.56   The precise 
extent and method of deployment would be calibrated according to circumstances, 
and Japan should seek to limit its adversary to Britain but should also make all 
preparations for possible war with the USA, which may be unavoidable.57  The 
conditions under which the militaristic form of nanshin would be implemented 
were thus clarified, in a time in which German advances in the war in Europe 
made the arising of a favourable situation for the Japanese an increasing 
likelihood. Developments in the European war in the spring of 1940, which saw 
the fall of France and the Low Countries and a besieged Britain increased the 
vulnerability of their colonies and presented an opportunity for Japan.58 Among 
the territories of the South Seas the NEI was the most promising target due to its 
vast reserves of strategic resources, particularly oil and also because it was the 
most poorly defended.59 Clearly aware of developments in the European front, 
nanshin which had primarily been advocated by the navy from the mid-1930s 
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began to gain acceptance within the Army as well, transforming the concept into a 
part of national policy.60
               This expansionist, official form of nanshin was packaged in the form of 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which made references to liberation 
from colonial rule and forming an Asia for the Asians under Japan’s leadership, 
so as to make it more palatable to  the other Asian peoples it was pitched to.61  At 
its core, however, was not the liberation of these territories but the establishment 
of autarky based on exploiting their resources. This was evident in documents 
approved just before and after the commencement of the Pacific War in 
November and December 1941 respectively. The first of these documents, Nanpō 
senryōchi gyōsei jisshi yōkō (南方占領地行政実施要綱), made clear the intent to 
secure essential strategic resources to ensure self-sufficiency for troops involved 
in operations, while the latter document, Nanpō keizai taisaku yōkō (南方経済対
策要綱 ) made the acquisition of strategic resources essential for continued 
prosecution of the war effort a main objective of economic policy towards the 
region.62
            These were thus the reasons for Japan’s military advance into the South 
Seas, launched in December 1941. Within a few months Japanese armies had 
swept through the region, bringing the larger part of it within its empire under the 
euphemism of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  This new state of 
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affairs would create new roles for the Nanyō Kyōkai, as it was roped into the 
management of Japan’s enlarged empire.  
             The impact of the Japanese conquest of the Nanyō on the Nanyō Kyōkai 
will be discussed mainly in terms of the new roles it found itself filling in support 
of Japanese administration and future plans. Its research and publication activities 
continued, with the journal continued to be published until October 1944; the 
direction in which the association was moving in this realm of activity had 
become apparent by the late 1930s, and there would be no reversal in the 
following years. It had become more supportive of the government perspective 
and line of argument from the 1940s onwards, with ample references to the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the development of the Southern 
areas as Japanese mission and the rightness of this course of action in every issue, 
though undoubtedly there continued to be articles on economic and cultural 
matters, such as the volume of imports in woven goods in British Malaya or the
symbolism of White elephants in Siam.63  As for other areas of activity such as 
lobbying, these became redundant and stopped with Japan’s conquest of the 
region.
            Besides continuing to offer verbal support for government policies in its 
publications, the association’s role in the new order in the Nanyō was mainly in 
terms of education and training in support of military administration, running a 
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123
training institute, language schools and hosting groups of local young men from 
the occupied territories sent to study in Japan. 
             The first and most significant of these new initiatives was the 
establishment of the Nanyō Gakuin, established in January 1942 in Saigon under 
the association’s management but administered by first the Gaimushō and then 
the Greater East Asia Affairs Ministry from October 1944 onwards.64  With the 
intent of training talented young men who would devote themselves to the 
construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, this institute offered a 
three-year curriculum in economics, agriculture, business and medicine while also 
training them in the French and Vietnamese languages and basic legal 
knowledge.65 Amidst the deterioration of Japan’s military position, only the first 
batch of students completed the course, with the majority appointed to Japanese 
government agencies and commercial firms while others were drafted as French 
and Vietnamese interpreters by the military. 66 As the situation continued to 
worsen for the Japanese, by 1945 most of the Nanyō Gakuin’s students and 
graduates were drafted into military service.67 This short-lived programme thus 
ended without being able to achieve much beyond providing manpower for the 
military, though this was perhaps not too far from its initial aim of training future 
leaders and administrators of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
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Interestingly, a number of its ex-students who survived the war were later active 
in Japan-Vietnam cultural exchanges in the postwar era, making an assessment of 
the institute from a long-term perspective a rather complex affair.68
            In addition to teaching French and Vietnamese to Nanyō Gakuin students, 
the association also taught Japanese to the local peoples, coming up with teaching 
materials and operating two language schools in Saigon and Jakarta.69 The school 
in Saigon, attached to the Nanyō Gakuin was opened in June 1943 and had an 
enrollment of 770 students.70  The school in Jakarta not only taught Japanese to 
the locals but also Bahasa Indonesia to resident Japanese. 71 Named the Kōa 
Nippongo Gakkō (興亜日本語学校), it was set up as an annex to the Kōa Bunka 
Kaikan (興亜文化会館), which had been founded at the request of and with the 
assistance of the 16th Army in Java and was also involved in hosting Japanese 
dignitaries visiting Java and disseminating information about Japan.72      
            The association’s language training activities were not just limited to 
conducting lessons, but also in writing a textbook for teaching the language 
together with Japanese customs, culture and manners. 73   This task had been 
undertaken as part of the Japanese Army’s plans to indoctrinate the local 
population with the Japanese sprit, based on the concept of the Japanese language 
as a medium through which to transmit the Japanese spirit and culture to the local 
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populations and also as a common language to promote unity between the 
different races.74 This textbook’s contents bear testimony to the aims of the above 
policy.  Titled Nippongo no hanashikata(ニッポンゴノハナシカタ), it called 
upon teachers of the language to keep in mind their mission of demonstrating the 
strength and benevolence of Japan so as to win the people’s minds, to take every 
opportunity to share about Japanese culture, and described the language as the 
future lingua franca of Greater East Asia.75 Besides basic knowledge of Japanese 
language and customs to be taught through the inclusion of popular Japanese 
folktales such as Momotarō and symbols such as the cherry blossom, the syllabus 
also aimed to inculcate the proper sense of respect for the Emperor as well as 
knowledge of the greatness of the Japanese Army and Navy. 76   It further 
instructed teachers to promote the “correct” understanding of the Pacific War 
through asking guiding questions regarding the conflict’s causes. 77   Several 
thousand copies of this textbook were distributed in the occupied territories.78
These efforts were part of a wider education policy that included introducing the 
Japanese language not just as a new subject in the region’s schools but also as a 
medium of instruction alongside native languages such as Malay.79
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             Through these activities it can be seen that the Nanyō Kyōkai had moved 
a long way from its original mission of filling the knowledge gap in Japan within 
the region so as to promote economic interaction and mutual understanding. 
Although the concern with enhancing Japan’s national power and the perception 
of the land and resource rich region as holding solutions for Japan’s domestic 
troubles had always existed within the association, the interest it had previously 
taken in and expressed regarding the Nanyō had primarily been economic, 
without evidence of it encouraging military invasion and conquest.  Having 
played an important role in the nanshin-ron of the Taishō era and assessed to have 
kept interest in the region alive through its research and publication activities in 
the absence of significant interest in the Nanyō following the end of WWI, the 
expansionist form of nanshin-ron that arose in the mid-1930s and manifested as 
concrete national policy was arguably not what its founders intended, but with 
many of its members and sponsors drawn from government circles, it was drawn 
into government plans for the region and, following conquest and occupation, into 
supporting the military administration.  Having little evidence pertaining to the 
issue it is impossible to ascertain whether there was any debate or resistance 
among its members regarding the path it took from the late 1930s onwards, except 
for founder and long-time leader Inoue Masaji’s resignation and founding of his 
own organization Inoue Minzoku Seisaku Kenkyūjo (井上民族政策研究所) to 
grapple with his ideas regarding the region independently. 80   Otherwise it 
appeared to have docilely gone along the new paths it was led towards. Following 
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Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, the Nanyō Kyōkai was dissolved in 1945, as a 
very different organization from the one it had been at its founding and had 
operated as for most of its history.
Different roles in the wartime empire: Comparisons and Explanations
            The final period of the Nanyō Kyōkai and the SMR’s Research 
Department’s history was closely linked to the expansion and collapse of the 
Japanese empire, with both roped into activities in support of the war effort or in 
the administration of occupied regions. Strangely, little work seems to have been 
done regarding the Tōyō Kyōkai’s activities over this period.  It is known that it 
was in existence till 1945 and likely broke up following Japan’s defeat in WWII, 
and, based on the volumes of research documents it left behind, appeared to have 
been quite active in conducting research up until around 1943 or 1944. The series 
of monthly research pamphlets, Chōsa shiryō panfuretto (調査資料パンフレッ
ト) it had began issuing in June 1935 continued to be published until May 1943, 
totaling 51 issues. 81 Despite its title, these were substantial, detailed studies 
conducted by the research department of the Tōyō Kyōkai  on topics relevant to 
Japan and the war effort, ranging from the resources of greater East Asia with 
individual sections dedicated to the various territories that fell within Japan’s 
colonial empire, the underground resources of Korea, to updates on the political 
situation prevailing in China as well as particular developments such as the Xian 
Incident that were expected to impact on the direction of the Sino-Japanese 
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conflict.82 Its academic journal Tōyō Gakuhō, published by the academic section 
of its research department continued on its established path of serious, academic 
scholarship that was almost esoteric during the war, with the last issue published 
in August 1944 before a three year hiatus featuring articles on land measurements 
during the Ming Dynasty and horse breeding and trading during the Five 
Dynasties era.83  The research pamphlets and the Tōyō Kyōkai’s monthly journal 
Tōyō ceased publication after 1944, while the Tōyō Gakuhō resumed publishing in 
1947 and continues as an academic journal to the present day under the Tōyō 
Bunko, a separate organization founded in 1924. Details as to how this came 
about are unknown, as with what happened to the Tōyō Kyōkai after August 1945.
With such little information to form the basis of analysis, much less comparison 
with the other two organizations, it will not be mentioned subsequently in this 
chapter. 
             As for the Tōa Dōbunkai, having recommenced its activities outside the 
realm of education and research following the Manchurian Incident in 1931 in the 
form of enthusiastically supporting the expansion of Japanese interests and the 
formation of Manchukuo, as well as sending its graduates to work in the 
construction of the new state, continued on the same path in the aftermath of the 
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outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.84 In its role of an institution working in 
support of government policy, it launched a weekly news magazine Tōa Shūhō
(東亜週報 ) to promote the government’s policies and also encouraged Tōa 
Dōbun Shoin students to enlist in the army.85 Following the established Shoin 
tradition of service in Japan’s military conflicts with China, its graduates and 
upperclassmen served in positions of military intelligence and translators in this 
latest war. 86  Under graduate and Foreign Ministry official Iwai Eiichi, a new 
Special Investigation Unit gathered and analysed data pertaining to unoccupied 
China, with new Shoin graduates forming approximately one third of its research 
staff. 87  A similarity thus existed between the Tōa Dōbunkai and the Nanyō 
Kyōkai in terms of their support for the war effort through propaganda, but this 
was not a significant change for the Tōa Dōbunkai in the way it was for the 
Nanyō Kyōkai, due to the existence of the Shoin tradition as mentioned earlier. 
Furthermore, while the Tōa Dōbunkai was active in wartime research, the role of 
research in the Nanyō Kyōkai’s activties was diminished. Both of these 
differences can be understood as products of circumstances, in that the series of 
conflicts between China and Japan since 1894 had created the need for 
intelligence and translators the Shoin filled perfectly, whereas there had not been 
any similar need faced by the Nanyō Kyōkai until the Pacific War due to the 
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different nature of prior Japan-Nanyō interactions. The research needs in an 
ongoing war with China that had swiftly bogged down after Japan’s early gains 
were also different from that of the occupied South Seas, which will be discussed 
further in the comparison of the Nanyō Kyōkai and the SMR.
             The Pacific War had dramatically altered the conditions under which the 
Nanyō Kyōkai operated in the South Seas. Formerly a region largely under the 
control of other colonial powers, in which the association had to take care not to 
arouse undue suspicion and Japanese government agencies sought to conceal their 
role in association activities so as to prevent the arising of new obstacles to plans 
for economic expansion or immigration, it had fallen to Japanese control from 
1942 to 1945, thus removing the constraints under which the association had 
formerly operated. However, this change in the region’s relationship with Japan 
also meant that most of the former activities of the Nanyō Kyōkai were no longer 
relevant in this new situation; its original mission of promoting economic 
interaction through producing and disseminating knowledge of the region an 
anachronism. Its main roles thus became that of supporting the occupation of the 
region through training future leaders of this portion of the Japanese empire, 
ideological indoctrination through language teaching and propagandizing Japan’s 
viewpoint, much in line with Japanese cultural policies toward Southeast Asia 
during this period. 88             
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             A narrowing of the gap between the circumstances in which the SMR’s 
Research Branch and the Nanyō Kyōkai worked arguably occurred, in terms of 
how both were now working in Japan’s overseas empire, but even then their 
experiences during this period of conflict was greatly different. To begin with the 
SMR’s Research Branch kept its function as a research organ, despite coming 
under the direction of the Army, unlike the Nanyō Kyōkai, which had moved 
away from its research functions which were once a key area of its activities. 
Although the Nanyō Kyōkai, unlike the SMR’s Research Branch had not 
previously been solely devoted to research, from the middle to the late 1930s it 
had primarily been useful for military planners and policy makers as a source of 
information, as seen in how they made the effort of attending the association’s 
public lectures. There were even suspicions by colonial security forces that the 
association was a cover for intelligence gathering activities in the guise of 
engaging in harmless economic activities, suspicions for which further proof 
besides security forces’ reports have yet to show up, but which nonetheless reveal 
the way in which it had been perceived because of its activeness in the realm of 
research and collecting information.89            
         On the other hand the SMR’s Research Department not only continued to 
exist as a distinct research-based entity but even expanded during the wartime 
period, with its staff growing from 1731 researchers in April 1939 to 2345 a year 
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later, constituting the largest expansion in its history.90 This development was 
driven by the army’s need for integrated research for long-term planning, in the 
face of continued resistance in China, so much so that it appeared not to mind that 
the bulk of these new researchers had leftist backgrounds.91  The main projects 
undertaken by this expanded Research Department dealt with inflation in the 
Japanese bloc, conditions in Chinese villages, output of domestic heavy industries, 
means of ensuring access to resources in occupied areas and notably, China’s 
ability to continue waging war, in the form of a massive research report regarded 
as the representative work of the Research Department.92
            Titled Shina kōsen ryoku chōsa( 支那抗戦力調査), work on this 970,000 
word report commenced in May 1939 and was presented to the army in May 
1940. 93 Covering characteristics of Chinese society, mobilization, military 
strength, wartime economy, agriculture and foreign aid to analyze the sources and 
strength of Chinese resistance, it concluded that even if Japan could not be 
defeated by China, a clear cut Japanese victory was unattainable.94 On this basis it 
called for a political end to the Sino-Japanese War, displeasing the army and 
creating further cause for the army’s clampdown on the department that began the 
next year on the pretext of a Communist plot being hatched within its 
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researchers.95 From the reception to this report it was also clear that while its 
research was valued, it could also be blatantly disregarded when its conclusions 
went against the hopes of the army.96          
           The areas of research undertaken by the Research Department provide 
hints as to why it expanded while the Nanyō Kyōkai was directed to activities in 
other areas pertaining to occupation policies. One factor was probably the 
different scale of resistance experienced by the Japanese army in China and in the 
South Seas. With the Sino-Japanese War stuck in a stalemate by 1938 and 
continued Chinese resistance on a significant scale, there was much research 
could offer in terms of providing a  better picture of enemy resistance and what 
could be done for more effective prosecution of the war. On the other hand 
following the swift fall of the Nanyō territories in which there was limited local 
resistance for the most part of the occupation, the future situation in the region 
was dependent not so much on local factors as upon the outcome of the conflict in 
Europe. In this context any research conducted by the Nanyō Kyōkai had much 
less immediate significance than that conducted by the SMR’s Research 
Department in China and was also relatively less important than contributing to 
the military administration of the region or teaching the local populations to be 
good members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, from an 
operational perspective.  Such differences in the circumstances prevailing in the 
territories they were engaged in thus explains their divergent experiences in the 
                                                          
95 Ibid., p.147; Fogel, “Itō Takeo and the Research Work of the South Manchurian Railway 
Company”, pp.131-132.
96 Fogel, “Itō Takeo and the Research Work of the South Manchurian Railway Company”, pp.131-
132.
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final years of the Japanese Empire, despite both the Nanyō Kyōkai and the 
Research Department operating in territories under Japanese control after 1942.
             One final observation that might be drawn from the above developments, 
which can also count as a similarity was the limited influence of research. The 
Nanyō Kyōkai’s research on the region that had not been conducted with serving 
military conquest in mind in the mid-1930s had been utilized for planning 
purposes by the military, but with new circumstances that came about following 
the region’s conquest the army no longer saw it and the knowledge it had on local 
conditions as useful in terms of information providers, but in terms of supporters 
of military administration. Ultimately its research was unable to achieve the aims 
it had set out in its mission statement at its founding but was instead used for a 
form of nanshin far beyond its founders and leadership had intended for most of 
its history. As for the SMR’s Research Department, its research had always been 
intended to support policy making and governance in Manchuria, with this role 
expanded following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Despite it having 
served as a research organ till the end of its history, it also saw its research and 
recommendations disregarded by those in power who found it unpalatable. Not 
only were its findings brushed aside despite being correct in their projections, but 
furthermore became cause for the army to act against the department.   At any rate, 
as products of Japan’s age of imperialism, the history of both groups came to an 
end following Japan’s surrender and the collapse of the empire it had established; 
the SMR dissolved on orders of the Allied Supreme Commander in the Pacific, 
135
the Nanyō Kyōkai breaking up in circumstances in which its mission or activities 
were no longer of relevance.                        
136
Conclusion
            It was perhaps a fitting end for the Nanyō Kyōkai to be dissolved at the 
end of WWII. Having emerged amidst circumstances created by a major conflict, 
the history of the Nanyō Kyōkai can arguably be described as having come full 
circle with its dissolution at the end of a succeeding conflict whose root causes 
were inseparable from the settlement of the preceding war.   
            How might the Nanyō Kyōkai and its activities be assessed, after seeing 
the continuities and changes over its thirty-year history?  For the greater part of its 
history it had maintained its characteristics of being a semi-private, semi-official 
organization involved in a range of activities in the South Seas, only undergoing 
externally implemented changes that made it lose its private aspects to become 
more or less a front organization for the Japanese government following the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the changed perceptions regarding the 
Nanyō that followed.  However, even before these developments took place, there 
were aspects to its activities resulting from its close ties to the government, 
particularly in its conducting of land surveys and provision of information over a 
range of issues to government bodies that have led to it being assessed as a 
Japanese intelligence organ and advance guard for the invasion and occupation 
that began in 1941. Its wartime activities only augmented the belief that it was an 
advance guard that paved the way for Japanese territorial expansion into the 
region.                   
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            This goes back to the issues and questions raised in the Introduction, 
which will now be dealt with. While it can be said that the military invasion of the 
region that occurred was not something the association had actively promoted, 
based on the emphasis on peaceful economic interaction that was the prevailing 
theme in its publications prior to re-organization, its role in nanshin and the 
significance of its knowledge producing activities requires examination.
             The Nanyō Kyōkai’s founding in 1915 had been a new expression of 
Japanese interest in the South Seas, after which it established itself as the main 
advocate of nanshin-ron in the form of economic advance and immigration. 
Through the waxing and waning in Japanese interest in the region in the years 
following the association’s founding, it continued to pursue its mission of 
encouraging economic interaction mainly through collecting and disseminating 
information on the region and lobbying to remove hindrances to the activities of 
Japanese businesses in the region. From the end of the “Nanyō boom” in 1919 
until the mid-1930s its promotion of the region was in effect the primary 
expression of nanshin-ron in the absence of other voices that called for a different 
form of interaction with the region. It can thus be said that the association was 
both product of and contributor to nanshin-ron. 
            Yet the form of nanshin to which it had devoted itself did not fully come 
to pass. While interest in the region among business and political circles had 
never fully vanished, as seen in their commissioning of reports on the region from 
the association, and although Japanese enterprises achieved a significant degree of 
success in various realms of economic activity in the region ranging from trade to 
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mining, fishing and shipping, competing successfully to the extent that the 
Western colonial authorities felt the need to introduce regulation, besides the 
dominance of the Ishihara mining company in Malaya in the mining of iron ore 
and Japanese domination of the Philippine fishing and logging industries, 
Japanese economic advancement in the region had neither been consistent nor 
lasting. Japanese products made their largest gains during the early 1930s 
following the depreciation of the Japanese yen that effectively halved the price of 
Japanese goods. Granted, the already established Japanese presence and 
distribution networks in the region made it possible for them to swiftly capitalize 
on the situation, but developments arising from Japanese foreign policy would 
soon impede further growth in this area. Aside from anti-Japanese economic 
campaigns organized by the overseas communities, some of which made greater 
dents in Japan’s trade than others, Japanese businesses also had to deal with 
colonial legislation to curb Japanese imports which were inspired not solely by 
economics but also concerns regarding Japan’s intentions in the region. These had 
taken a toll on Japanese trade expansion by the later half of the 1930s, and how 
the situation would have developed in the 1940s can only be speculated upon as 
the militaristic strain of nanshin replaced economic nanshin. This shift was not 
unrelated to frustrations of Japanese economic expansion in the region during the 
late 1930s, an argument Mark R. Peattie has put forth effectively.1 It would thus 
seem that Japanese economic gains in the region had begun to see reverses in the 
                                                          
1 Mark R. Peattie, “ Nanshin: The “Southward Advance”, 1931-1941 as a Prelude to the Japanese 
Occupation of Southeast Asia”, in The Japanese Wartime Empire 1931-1945, ed. Peter Duus, 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.203-205.
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late 1930s, while the immigration projects carried out in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw mixed results at best. 
             What then was the impact of all its research and publication activities? 
Demand for its publishing output had certainly not been lacking, as seen in the 
more than 200 research reports on various aspects of and developments in the 
region it compiled and sent to external bodies. Even as late as the mid-1930s the 
lack of information on the region within Japan was still significant, to the extent 
that military and government planners attended the Nanyō Kyōkai’s lecture 
meetings to obtain information. The knowledge on the region the association had 
gathered, compiled, packaged and presented was not without an audience, the 
issue was that they were utilized not for the purposes the association had initially 
hoped for.  
              From the perspective of knowledge being a pre-condition for action to be 
taken, the association can be seen to have provided the foundational knowledge 
for the southward advance, especially in the absence of an opposing discourse on 
the region that might have been provided by an existing tradition of scholarship 
which could perhaps have presented a more complex perspective and enabled a 
different understanding of the region. 2 In the Nanyō Kyōkai’s publications there 
was an obvious economic slant to its presentation of the region, focusing on 
industries, agricultural and mineral resources, market conditions and trade figures. 
This limited version of the Nanyō it presented could only have fed into existing 
                                                          
2 Yokoi Kaori, “Nanyō Kyōkai taiwan shibu to taiwan sōtokufu 南洋協会台湾支部と台湾総督
府”, Tōyō Shihō東洋史訪, 4(March 1998), p. 44.
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perceptions of the region as abundant in land and resources, and the panacea to 
Japan’s domestic economic problems. Such perspectives were not far from the 
thinking behind Japan’s military expansion into the region. Stuck in a draining 
war in which a clear cut victory was out of reach, unwilling to work towards a 
negotiated settlement and feeling the effects of economic sanctions imposed by 
the Western powers, the Nanyō and its resources was seen as providing the 
solution to Japan’s problems. The existence of other smaller groups researching 
and presenting the region did not provide for an alternative perspective, being part 
of institutions such as the Bank of Taiwan whose focus was not substantially 
different from those of the Nanyō Kyōkai and arguably reinforced the 
association’s presentation of the region through their own focus on economic 
aspects.  In the 1930s, the association can be seen to have served as an 
intelligence organ and advance guard.  It can therefore be said that the Nanyō 
Kyōkai and its activities had enabled nanshin, but was powerless to direct the 
form it took, as witnessed in developments from the late 1930s to 1942. 
Following the conquest of the region the association was drawn further into 
directly supporting Japan’s policy in the South Seas, as a result of its experience 
and expertise in the area, further illustration of the above point. 
                 Moving on to another issue, could the Nanyō Kyōkai’s activities be 
said to have constituted a different model of knowledge production? Probably not, 
even though many aspects of its experiences can justifiably be described as 
unique. It is problematic to say it was a different model, for while other groups 
such as the Tōyō Kyōkai and the SMR’s Research Department had a greater 
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degree of government protection in operating under territories under Japanese 
control or influence, there was nothing significantly different about the Nanyō 
Kyōkai’s activities in this realm. The Tōa Dōbunkai was relatively more similar 
to the Nanyō Kyōkai than the other two organizations in terms of the conditions 
under which its research was conducted, for despite the existence of Japanese 
rights in cities such as Shanghai, its field research in China’s hinterland was 
conducted outside these spheres of influence. The Nanyō Kyōkai had collected 
information and packaged it according to the purpose it intended such knowledge 
to be utilized, as had other organizations or agencies engaged in similar activities. 
The nature of Japan’s interactions with the respective territories in which these 
organizations were active, the scale of Japanese interests at stake, the purposes 
each organization saw itself as serving and government requirements for certain 
types of information depending on its precise needs in dealing with a particular 
region at a given point in time accounted for the differences in the kinds of 
research conducted across organizations and also their activities outside the realm 
of research. The Nanyō Kyōkai’s    experience of providing a cover for a 
government directed feasibility study regarding immigration to territories under 
the control of a different government was, however probably unique, as was the 
specific changes it encountered as Japan’s policy towards and later its relationship 
with the region saw drastic changes during the association’s history. 
               The Nanyō Kyōkai’s disbandment in 1945, along with other similar 
groups such as the Tōyō Kyōkai had seemed to signal the end of an era, with such 
groups and their activities no longer relevant. Yet it would seem that the Nanyō 
142
Kyōkai’s history and legacy still bears some relevance in the present age. The 
Intercultural Communication Foundation (異文化コミュニケーション財団 , 
ICF), an organization that seeks to further intercultural understanding, claims to 
have its roots in the Nanyō Kyōkai, despite the gap of over fifty years that 
separates the end of WWII and the ICF’s emergence in 1999, academic 
recognition of the Nanyō Kyōkai as having disbanded in 1945, and the vastly 
different aims of the two organizations in drastically different eras.3 While the 
brief history of the Nanyō Kyōkai the ICF presents is both simplified and 
idealized, the reappearance of an entity that supposedly ceased to be decades ago 
raises questions regarding the memory and an alternative understanding of the 
association outside academia that has cast a positive light upon  a connection to it. 
             
                                                          
3 Certain changes appear to have taken place within this organization since this study began. 
Formerly a non-governmental organization linked with language school NOVA which has also 
been described as a religious organization and apparently collapsed in late 2008, the ICF has since 
had a change in leadership (from Sahashi Nozomu to Nakano Tamotsu), location (from Tokyo to 
Hyogo) and website (from http://www.icf.jp to http://newicf.org/index.php), though certain online 
information that refers to the pre-2008 ICF still exists. Regarding the disbandment of the Nanyō 
Kyōkai, a degree of consensus exists in scholarship on the association in that Akashi Yōji, Hyung 
Gu Lynn and Kawanishi Kōsuke all mention its disbandment in 1945, while other works that tend 
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